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INTRoDucnoN
Regulations with important public purposes sometimes take
away the value of a citizen's property no less completely than if the
government had physically confiscated it. The United States
Supreme Court has often wrestled with, but never subdued, the
question of how far a regulation has to go before it becomes a tak
ing of property sufficient enough to require just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 1
•

J.D.; Reference Librarian, New York Law School Library, N.Y., N.Y.

I would like to thank Professors Richard B. Bernstein, Linda Keenan, William P.

LaPiana, and David S. Schoenbrod for their encouragement and helpful comments on
earlier drafts. I am grateful to the Cooperative Services Department of New York Pub
lic's Main Research library, New York Law School Library and its staff, and especially
to the Fall River Public Library and Deborah Collins at the Fall River Historical Soci
ety, whose assistance made this research possible.
1. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evan
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 483 (1987).
For a sampling of the extensive literature on takings law, see, e.g., RICHARD Ep·
29
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The Court most recently addressed the problem in Lucas v.' South
Carolina Coastal Council,2 and the case has generated a mass of
controversy and scholarly attention. 3
Whether a regulation is construed as a taking or as a legitimate
exercise of. police power determines the critical issues ,of whether
compensation is awarded, for what amount, and for what period of
time. 4 Considerations include whether the taking was total or par
tial, its purpose,5andto what extent, if at all, the owner's use of his
property infringed upon the health or rights of others. The judicial
test is notoriously, if understandably, obscure. 6
As recently as 1922, it was generally assumed that "the Takings
Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property or the
functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] posses
sion."'7 In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,s the state had enacted a
STEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF' EMINENT DOMAIN (1985);
BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); Joseph L.
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)'; Joseph L. Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
.
2. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
3. See, e,g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tan
gled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); Richard Miniter, The Shifting
Ground of Property Rights, 9 INSIGHT Aug. ,23; 1993, at 4, 9-10.
A LEXIS search in the spring of 1994 turned up 117 law review articles on the
Lucas case. Most of the commentary concentrates on the legal issues; I am presently
researching the case from its (more interesting) factual perspective.
4. See First English, 482 U.S. 304. On remand .from the Supreme Court, the
plaintiffs in Lucas did not receive damages because the temporary taking of the use of
their property was not considered total. Telephone Interview with Bachman Smith III,
Esq., Counsel for South Carolina Coastal Commission (April 4, 1994).
5. The legal definition of "public purpose" is not clear. See, e.g., Poletown Neigh
borhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) (determining
public purpose is a legislative function).
6. One work has labelled this elusive distinction "the most haunting jurispruden
tial problem in the field of contemporary land-use law ... one that may be the lawyer's
equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A.
WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF
URBAN LAND 875 (4th ed. 1989). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 853, 866 (1987) (Steven.s, J., dissenting) ("Even the wisest lawyers would have
to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings jurispru
dence."); Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal
Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIG. 3
(1990) ("It is something of an open secret that the Supreme Court has yet to firmly
define the boundaries of regulatory taking jurisprudence.").
7., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992) (citations
omitted) (alteration in original).
8. 260 U.S, 393 (1922).
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statute, the Kohler Act, that prohibited coal mining when the min
ing caused land· which the mining company did not own to collapse,
even when it had purchased the right to undermine the property.9
The plaintiff's house was in danger because of the mining com
pany's activities, but the plaintiff had purchased the property with
knowledge of a prior deed that had granted the company the right
to undermine the property. To give the plaintiff the benefit of the
statute would force the coal company to leave coal in the ground it
could otherwise have mined. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
found for the coal company, stating that,
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking . .. '. We are in danger
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change. to

Holmes would not grant the plaintiff, through the operation of a
statute, greater rights than he had bargained for and purchased. l1
Justice Louis D. Brandeis was the only dissenter in Mahon.
9. See the Brief for Defendants in Error at 6-8, Mahon Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922) (No. 549) and the Brief ex rei City of Scranton at 2-5, Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
for descriptions of the effects of subsidence.
10. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16 (emphasis added). The decision was not popular
with Holmes', colleagues. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER 'WENDELL HOLMES:
LAW AND THE INNER SELF 401-03 (1993).
In Mugler v. Kansas, the Court had held that a restriction on the use of property
that the legislature deemed detrimental to the public health, morals, or safety could not
be considered a taking of property necessitating compensation to the owner. 123 U.S.
623,669 (1887). Holmes called the reasoning in such cases "pretty fishy." 1 HOLMES
LASKI LETTERS 473 (M. Howe ed. 1953) (cited in E.F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice
Holmes, 39 VAND. L. REv. 287, 292 n.27 (1987».
As the Court said in Lucas, compensable cases will now be found where a regula
tion denies "all economically productive or beneficial uses of land," but the point at
which to draw the line remains a problem. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. As Justice Scalia
admits:
It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get
nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full. But that occa
sional result is no more strange than the gross disparity between the land
owner whose premises are taken fora highway (who recovers in full) and the
landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the high
way (who recovers nothing).
.
[d. at 2895 n.8. But see Epstein, supra note 3, at 1376 (calling the second example
"merely a form of competition against which no landowner is ever entitled to compen
sation"). Professor Epstein goes on to ask, now that the Court has announced that a
100% deprivation of value requires compensation, "what legislature will be foolish
enough to take an entire plot of land?" [d. at 1377.
11. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416.
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While he acknowledged that any exercise of the police power re
garding the use of property inevitably restricts its owners without
compensating them, he believed that "restriction imposed to pro
tect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is
not a taking.... The State merely prevents the owner from making
a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. "12
Takings jurisprudence has recently been in an even 'greater
than usual flux. In 1987, the Court decided Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,13 in which, although the facts were sim
ilar to those of Mahon, the Court held that the earlier case did not
control,14 In Keystone, the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act, and regulations promulgated under it, required
that fifty percent of the coal beneath certain protected structures be
left in the ground to support the surface. 1S Coal companies sued to
enjoin the Department of Environmental Resources from enforcing
the Act and its regulations on the grounds that they effected a tak
ing of property (twenty-seven million tons of coal, or about two
percent of their total reserves) and interfered with the contractual
waivers of liability that the companies had negotiated with surface
owners,16 The Court ignored Pennsylvania's distinction between
surface, mineral, and support estates, upheld the statute, and found
no taking,17 The Court, reminiscent of Brandeis' dissent in Mahon,
deferred to, the legislative judgment, that any interference with the
"investment-backed expectations" of the petitioners was necessary
to achieve the public purpose of the statute,18 which was to prevent
a "significant threat to the common welfare. "19
The juxtaposition of these two cases shows the changing expec
tations and different regulatory atmospheres of the periods in which
they were decided. Dissenting in Keystone, Chief Justice Rehnquist
12. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis also said the opinion was the
result of Holmes' "class bias." WHITE, supra note 10, at 555 n.124 (quoting Melvin I.
Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 299, 321).
13. 480 U.S. 470,481-502 (1987).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 477.
16. Id. at 478-79.
17. Id. at 480-81.
18. Id. at 505-06.
19. Id. at 485. Holmes had found the Kohler Act to be a "private benefit" stat
ute, partly because it usually did not apply when the surface and the coal were, owned
by the same party; thus its "public purpose" did not justify the destruCtion of constitu
tionally protected rights: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922).
No such limitation was found in the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conserva
tion Act.
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pointed out that the statutes at issue in each case were "strikingly
similar"; he would have followed Mahon and found a taking. 20 He
considered the value of the fraction of petitioner's coal deposits
which had been destroyed by the statutory requirement,21 whereas
the majority compared the value of the petitioner's entire holdings
to the relatively small percentage at issue.22 The Chief Justice be
lieved ,that petitioners had been deprived of all use of a segment of
their property as effectively as if it had been physically appropri
ated. 23 It is perhaps no coincidence that Keystone and two other
leading United States Supreme Court takings c,ases24 occurred dur
ing the recession of the late 1980s, when public desire for regulation
collided with public reluctance to finance such regulation with tax
dollars.
In Mahon, two old friends, Holmes and Brandeis, uncharacter
istically disagreed. 25 Thirty years earlier, however, they had ulti
mately agreed with each other on a conceptually similar issue. The
Watuppa Ponds cases had presented such a problem, eventually
known as a "regulatory taking," in the context of water power,
which immediately preceded coal as the primary power source in
the East. Brandeis and his first law partner, Samuel D. Warren, Jr.,
had joined forces to fight a proposed state statute that would have
extended the holding of the second Watuppa case. They believed
the statute would take the property of mill owners on the river that
exited the ponds by decreasing its volume. Their efforts may have
persuaded Holmes, then of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, to hold in the final case that the mills should be compen
sated for their losses. The pivotal evidence was a deed, as it would
be later in Mahon. Although, ancient and previously unknown to
the plaintiffs, it proved sufficient to support their claims. Legal sta
20. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 507, 508-13 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist was joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia.
21. [d. at 514.
22. [d. at 476-77.
23. [d. at 517-18. The tension between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Keystone resurfaced in the South Carolina Supreme Court opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.c. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992)
("Lucas' position and the position of our dissenting brothers, is the position of the dis
sent in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis (citation omitted), while the
Coastal Council's view is represented by the Keystone majority .... [W]e choose to
follow the majority view rather than the dissent in Keystone.").
24. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Ev
angelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
25. ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 570-71 (1946).
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bility eventually prevailed, despite the economic turmoil of the re
gion and per!0d.
.
The tale of the Watuppa Pond cases and related events is worth
narrating, not only because it is a good yarn, but also for the insight
it sheds on Holmes and Brandeis and on the development of doc
trine that remains in dispute to this day. This Article is its first full
telling.

I.

THE WATUPPA PONDS CASES

The Quequechan (pronounced "quick-e-shan"), or Fall River,
originated in North and South Watuppa Ponds, which were con
nected by a narrow passageway and covered about 3300acres.26
After two miles, the river emptied into tide waters; during its last
half mile it fell 130 feet, and it was there the original mills were
located.27 In 1889, the city of Fall River depended entirely on the
prosperity of its 57 cotton mills, which operated 43,875 looms and
2,000,00D spindles (one-seventh of the total in the entire country),
produced about 500,000,000 yards of cloth a year, and employed a
total of 20,000 people with a weekly payroll of about $125,000; their
invested capital amounted to $20,000,000. 28 Fall. River had many
advantages as an industrial city, and had become the leading textile
manufacturing center in the country by 1875.29
In 1871, the Massachusetts legislature authorized Fall River to
appropriate water from North Watuppa Pond for domestic pur
poses and explicitly made the city liable if a resulting diminution in
water power affected the mills adversely.30 Prior to -1886, 222 acts
26. Samuel D. Warren, Jr. & Louis D. Brandeis, The Watuppa Pond Cases, 2
HARV. L. REv. 195, 195-96 (1888).
27. Id. at 196; see also 1 LoUIS C. HUNTER, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL POWER
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1930, at 533 (1979).
28. Silent Looms. Fall River Weavers Begin the Battle, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE,
Mar. 12, 1889, at 1, (morning ed.); Weavers Wearing Green. Fall River Strike Hides Its
Diminished Head During Feast Day of St. Patrick, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 18,
1889, at 1 (evening ed.).
The 1888 dollar was worth approximately $42.65 in 1989 dollars. The figure is de
rived from THE VALUE OF A DOLLAR: PRICES AND INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES
1860-1989, at 2 (Scott Derks ed., 1994). The weekly payroll would thus be equivalent to
$5,331,250 in 1989, and the invested capital an impressive $853,000,000.
. 29. THOMAS R. SMITH, THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY OF FALL RIVER, MAS
SACHUSETTS 40 (1944).
30. The statute read:
[T]he city of Fall River shall be liable to pay all damages that shall be sus
tained by any person or persons in their property by the taking respectively of
the entire waters of said North Watuppa Pond, or by the taking of any less
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of this kind similarly provided for compensation to mill owners in
Massachusetts, consistent with the common law's treatment of ripa-:
rian owners' rights to a flow of water. 31 In 1873, the city accord
ingly passed a bill taking 1,500,000 gallons of water per day from
the Watuppa Ponds.32
The Watuppa Ponds, however, were not ordinary ponds. They
were "great ponds," as were many bodies of water affected by the
appropriation acts.33
II.

WHAT

Is

A "GREAT POND?"

The colonists of Massachusetts Bay Colqny considered its
many, large, freshwater ponds and lakes too vital to the commu
nity's survival to permit them to be privately owned. 34 Horace
Gray, Jr., in Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury,35 noted that while
the colonists were eager to enact a body of laws, they did not want
to be perceived as overstepping the command in their charter to
"make no laws repugnant to the laws of England."36 Their first
proportion of said waters, as authorized by the second and third sections of
this act, or by the taking of any land, rights of way, water rights or easements.
St. of 1871, c. 133, § 10,cited in Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa /"), 134
Mass. 267, 268 (1883).
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 195, 199. The common law of water
courses evolved prior to the nineteenth century industrial expansion, and was founded
upon the maxim, aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat; that is, water flows, and
should flow, as 'it is accustomed to flow. Every owner of property through which water
passed was entitled to its use. Similar to the concept of prescription, this rule was modi
fied to avoid an inevitable anti-development effect as the demand for water power in
creased. THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND
niE WATERS OF NEW ENGLAND 140-48 (1991).
32. Watuppa /,134 Mass. at 268.
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 195.
34. Slater v. Gunn, 49 N.E. 1017, 1020 (Mass. 1898); West Roxbury v. Stoddard,
89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 167 (1863).
35. 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 503-28 (1857) (editor Horace Gray, Jr., reporting in a
note following the decision).
Gray was Reporter of Decisions for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
from 1854 to 1860. He served as Associate and then Chief Justice from 1864 to 1882. In
'1879, in the first year of his partnership with Samuel Warren, Louis Brandeis became
Chief Justice Gray's law clerk. STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITA
TIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF LoUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 75-76 (1994).
Gray joined the United States Supreme Court in 1882; in 1902, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. took his place. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d
356,360 n.3 (Mass. 1979).
36. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) at 513; see also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 53,71 (1851) (Shaw, C.J.): .
It might seem to them less aITogant to set forth and declare their 'liberties' and
rights in this form, than to enact in terms a body of laws, which might seem to
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code, the "Body of Liberties," ("colony ordinance" or "ordinance")
was published in manuscript form in 1641 and amended annually
until 1648.37
Section two of the colony ordinance read as follows:
"Every inhabitant who is a householder, shall have free fishing
and fowling in any great ponds, bays, coves[,] and rivers, so far as
the sea ebbes and flows within the precincts of the town where
they dwell, unless the freemen of the same town or the general
court have otherwise appropriated them.
Provided, that no town shall appropriate to any particular
person or persons, any great pond, containing more than ten acres
of land, and that no man shall come upon another's propriety
without their [sic] leave, otherwise than as hereafter expressed.
And for great ponds lying in common, though within the
bounds ofsome town, it shall be free for any man to fish and fowle
there, and may pass and repass on foot thrc;mgh any man's propri
ety for that end, so they [sic] trespass not upon any man's corn or
meadow. "38
indicate a disregard of the authority of the mother country. This use of the
term 'liberty,' as synonymous with right, franchise, and privilege, is strictly
conformable to the sense of the term as used in Magna Charta . . .. .
Id. See also Stoddard, 81J; Mass. (7 Allen) at 166 (discussing the colonists' desire to
make a code of written laws without "express legislation, in order to avoid any direct
antagonism with the government in England").
.
37. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) at 513. Many cases express confiision over the
exact date. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1893). See also Mark Cheung, Re
thinking the History ofthe Seventeenth-Century Colonial Ordinance: A Reinterpretation
of an Ancient Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115, 138-42 (1990).
According to Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810), the ordinance was "an
nulled with the charter by the authority of which it was made" in 1684, id., but Gray
says that the judgment against the charter was denied by the House of Commons, and
was never admitted here. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) at 517.
38, Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 197 (quoting Colonial Laws of Massa
chusetts 90). Gray suggested that the colony ordinance really (;>nly defined what ~as at
the time common usage, as a result of the exigencies of colonial life. Roxbury, 75 Mass.
(9 Gray) at 514-17. The contemporary version of the ordinance is codified at MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 131, § 45 (1992).
Note that the ordinance operated prospectively only and explicitly excluded ponds'
that had been granted into private hands prior to its enactment. Apparently, however;
few such conveyances were made. The second Watuppa Pond opinion said only one
was known and that it h~d been upheld as creating good title in the grantee. This con
veyance was made in 1635 to John Humfry, and consisted of "500 acres of land & a
freshe pond, with a little ileland conteyneing aboute two acres." Watuppa Reservoir
Co. v. City of Fall River ("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 470 (Mass. 1888); see also Stod
dard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) at 165 (citation omitted). Wiswell's Pond in "Newtown" was
the only other example I foup.d. See Stoneham v. Commonwealth, 144 N.E. 83, 84
(Mass. 1924).
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This provision concerning public ownership of, access to, and
use of ponds over' a certain size secured an important right, as
shown by its inclusion in the same chapter that dealt with freedom
of speech in courts and town meetings and the freedom of emigra
tion. 39 Its broad purpose, dear to the hearts of the colonists, was to
"declare a great principle of public right, to abolish the forest laws,
the game laws, and the Jaws designed to secure several and exclu
sive fisheries, and to make them all free. "40
On its face, the ordinance appeared to authorize a trespass to
the land surrounding a great pond if the property were not actually
damaged. This limitation on property ownership was understanda
ble given the primitive conditions under which the ordinance was
enacted. Inevitably, however, as the Commonwealth became more
densely populated, the ostensible easement that this created was
severely narrowed by the courts. In 1863, the question arose for the
first time 'whether the uses specified in the ordinance (fishing and
fowling) were exclusive; the court interpreted the public reservation
to be flexible enough to include additional uses. 41 Later cases, how-:
ever, held that the ordinance was only "intended to limit the pass:
ing and repassing to unimproved and uninclosed [sic] lands lying on
the ponds, and [was] to be construed with reference to the condi
tion of things existing when the ordinance was adopted. "42 The dis
tribution of competing rights among individuals, state and local
governments, and businesses, some of which had rights granted by
the legislature, became increasingly more complex. As cities and
towns proliferated in Massachusetts, the public's need for fresh
water and the mills' need for power came into direct conflict.
III.

WATUPPA

I

The Watuppa Reservoir Company was incorporated in 1826 to
construct a dam that would raise the water in the ponds to a certain
height and to maintain a reservoir for the benefit of the company's
39. See Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) at 168; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at
197.

40. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 68 (1851) (Shaw, c.J.).
41. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) at 167. The court stated:
With the growth of the community, and its progress in the arts, these public
reservations, at first set apart with reference to certain special uses only, be
come capable of many others which are within the design and intent of the
original appropriation. The devotion to public use is sufficiently broad to in
clude them all, as they arose.
[d.; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 205-06.
42. Slater v. Gunn, 49 N.E. 1017,J019-20 (Mass. 1898).
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stockholders, the mill-owners on the river. 43 In 1883, the company
and eight mills sued for damages from Fall River's 1873 appropria
tion of water and the resulting diminution in their water power.44
The city argued that the state owned the great ponds and the land
under them and that riparian owners on the Quequechan had no
right to the flow of water, contrary to their rights at common law. 45
The superior court disagreed and the supreme judicial court af
firmed; the 1871 statute had explicitly provided damages for injury
to water rights and the city was required to compensate the mills.
Furthermore, even the lowest mill on the stream, the American
Print Works, which used the water only for bleaching and cleansing
processes and not for power, was also entitled to damages. 46
Various local papers reflected the anger which the decision
aroused. The Fall River Daily Herald stated, "[t]his decision is con
trary to reason, though it may be quite in harmony with the law,
and it only shows how widely separated these two things sometimes
become."47 The Fall River Daily Evening News announced that
damages would amount to $76,780.95.48 The next day it claimed
43. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa l"), 134 Mass. 267, 269-70
(1883) (citing St. of 1826, ch. 31).
44. Id.; The Water Suits. Decided Finally Against the City, FALL RIVER DAILY
EVENING NEws, Mar. 1, 1883, ai 2.
.
Ten years may seem like a long time between the city's order and the suit, but the
controversy had been brewing for some time. See WILLIAM ROTCH, REpORT ON THE
CASE OF THE WATUPPA RESERVOIR CO. VS. THE CITY OF FALL RIVER (1880) (civil
engineering report on the computation of damages sustained by the city's taking of
water).
45. See infra part V-B.
46. Watuppa I, 134 Mass. at 270-71. Massachusetts in general, and Fall River in
particular, led the country in production of printed cloth, so possibly this mill was essen
tial to the others. See SMITH, supra note 29, at 86.
In 1881, Thomas Stetson, counsel for the city, argued forcefully that manufacturing
establishments which did not use water for power should not be able to recover any
damages. He reasoned that in 1825, when the reservoir company was incorporated,
none of the mills on the river had any other use for the water, as there was no steam
power in Fall River until 1838. Argument of Mr. Stetson 23-24 (Apr. 16, 1881). The
legislation that had protected Massachusetts mills since colonial days, see infra note 96,
had not contemplated using the water for steam, dyeing, bleaching or cleansing, but
only for driving a mill by a head of water. [d. at 23-25. In this peripheral issue, only
mentioned in passing in the dissent to the second opinion, Watuppa Reservoir v. City of
Fall River, 18 N.E. 465, 475, 478 (Mass. 1888) (Knowlton, J., dissenting), we see the
tension between ancient law and contemporary reality.
47. The Water Suits Decision, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 2, 1883, at 2.
48. The Water Suits. Decided Finally Against the City, supra note 44. Another
article says that an additional annual charge of up to $25,000 was possible. The Water
Suits Decision, supra note 47. In the briefs preceding the second suit, Stetson claimed
the amount paid was actually about $70,000. Hearings on Petition for an Act Granting
the City of Fall River Water from a Great Pond, Legis. Comm. upon Water Supply, 3, 5
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that the 1871 statute, the basis for the award to the mills, had been
drafted by a Judge Thomas, "learned counsel" for the company.49
Further, "shrewdness on one side [the city's lawyers], and public
spirit on the other [the mills] were wanting, and the city will be
under the galling necessity of paying in perpetuity for that as a priv
ilege which they ought to enjoy as a right."50 The article noted that
water power, as a source of energy, "was growing less valuable as
compared with steam year by year."51 .
In fact, Fall River had not become the major textile producer
in the country by remaining as it had begun, dependant upon the
falls of the Quequechan. The first mill had been built on the river
in 1813,52 but by 1850 the water power had been developed to the
fullest possible extent. Conveniently, at about the same time,
George Corliss' improvements in steam-powered engines made
them adaptable to textile mills.53 By 1860, Fall River's first three
steam powered mills had almost one quarter of the total number of
spindles in the city; by 1875, the city's eleven water wheels pro
duced only a fracti()n of the horsepower of its eighty-one steam en
gines. 54 Mills constructed in the last half of the century were no'
longer tied to the falls for power, but could obtain sufficient water
from wells or canals and could be located anywhere. 55 By 1883, all
the water-powered mills were provided with auxiliary steam power,
because. the river was an unreliable source of power in the sum
mer. 56 By the late 1880s, steam was the primary source of power.57
(May 18, 1886) (argument of Thomas M. Stetson, petitioner) [hereinafter Argument of
Thomas M. Stetson). The company asserted that the sum paid was considerably less,
$50,792.25. See Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Company at 24, Petition of the City of Fall
River for an Amendment to its Water Act 1871 Ch.133, (1886) [hereinafter Petition].
In contemporary dollars, damages would have ranged between $2,166,278 and
$2,985,500. See supra note 28.
49. The Water Suits, supra note 44.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, FALL
RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1883, at 1.
53. SMITH, supra note 29, at 45. The last two water-powered mills were built in
1846 and 1848. Id. at 46.
54. Id. at 47.
55. Id. at 71-79 and map at 73, showing the pattern of mill construction.
56. ROTCH, supra note 44, at 5; Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the
Committee on Health, supra note 52.
As early as 1836, several Fall River mills had steam power available for use during
droughts. 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 514. By 1880, "auxiliary steam power was
widely adopted in the principal river basins east of the Mississippi." Id. at 515.
57. SMITH, supra note 29, at 40.
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THE "WATUPPA NUISANCE" CASE

At the time of the first water suit, the Watuppa Reservoir
Company was embroiled in another controversy. When the water
in the ponds was low, the shore (or "flats") of the half~mile long
channel between the ponds and the company's dam became a
"'wet, rotten [and] spongy'" swamp.58 The resulting stenc~ from
sewage dumped there. by the mills and the city was offensive half a
mile away. It was considered at least detrimental to the public.
health, if not the actual source of scarlet fever, typhoid fever, and
diphtheria, and the cause of several deaths.59 The Board of Health
believed that the only way to abate the nuisance was to fill in the
flats. The company relied on its fight to flood the flats and vehe
mently disagreed, since filling would narrow the channel and de
plete the flow of water to the mills. It claimed that the abutting
property owners were merely trying to confiscate its property, arid
that it was entitled to compensation.60 After all, the company as
serted, it had not created the nuisance; the mills and the city had. 61
In 1877, Colin Mackenzie, an owner of property on the flats,
began filling the swamp and continued after the company ordered
him to stop. Two years later, the company sought an injunction, but
the Board of Health ordered Mackenzie, twice, to continue. The
company sued to restrain him, and won, despite the admission of its
lawyer, James M. Morton, that the land was not necessary to it. 62
The opinion ignored the legislature's right to condemn property
under its police power; it construed the company's charter in its
favor and the Board of Health's oroers to be "simply void."63 .The
58. Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra
note 52 (citation omitted).
.
59. Id.; see also The Watuppa Pond Nuisance, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 15,
1883, at 2. For twenty years, ending in 1876, the Hargraves soap works had boiled de.ad
cows and horses and poured its refuse into the stream and the ponds. The Watuppa
Flats. Hearing for the Abatement of the Nuisance, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS,
Mar. 8, 1883, at 1. The sewer system had not extended to the part of the city affected.
Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra note 52.
60. Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra
note 52. The company suggested $500,000 as appropriate compensation. The Watuppa
.
Nuisance, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 8, 1883, at 4.
61. The Watuppa Flats. Hearing for the Abatement ofthe Nuisance, supra note 59.
62. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Mackenzie, 132 Mass. 71 (1882). See also Nui
sances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra note 52. Mor
ton also argued for the company in Watuppa I, see supra part III, which he cited as
supportive of the company's rights here. The Watuppa Flats. Hearing for the Abatemimt
of the Nuisance, supra note 59.
63. Mackenzie, 132 Mass. at 73-74.
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case was then referred to a Master to determine damages from the
filling done before the injunction. 64
The Board of Health, "thus thwarted in their efforts, found
themselves helpless in an emergency demanding instant action" and
applied to the legislature. 65 Hearings followed, debating: (1) what,
if anything, should be done, (2) how the financial burden should be
allocated for both compensation to the cqmpany (if granted) and
the cqst of filling, and (3) the language of.a proposed bill to ensure
the abatement of the nuisance.66 All parties agreed that the nui
sance existed, but the city, after WatujJpa I, was loath to pay com
pensation to the company again. 67 Although. the company claimed
that its rights of flowage were equivalent to. ownership of the land,
it denied either responsibility or liability.68 Each party accused the
others of personal interest in the outcome and hotly contested
which group-commissioners appointed by the State Board of
Health, the City Council,69 or the Board of Aldermen-was best
qualified to abate the nuisance. 70 Although the members of the
legislative committee who participated in the hearings were sympa
64. The Watuppa Nuisance, FALL RIvER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 15, 1883, at 2.
65. Id. The papers were furious at th~ whole affair. An irllte article, published
after the court's decision in Watuppa I, said:
Taking the establishment ofthis claim [in the water case] in· connection with
the monstrous assumption of the Watuppa Reservoir Company to levy black
mail on the owners of the land along the river, and to prevent the filling in of
the land to the great inconvenience and danger of the whole popUlation of the
city, it becomes a question whether the people of Fall River have any rights
which these corporate tyrants are bound to respect.
The Water Suits Decision, supra note 47.
66. Hearings were reported in detail in: Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hear
ing by the Committee on Health, supra note 52; The Watuppa Flats. Hearing for the
Abatement of the Nuisance, supra note 59; The Watuppa Flats Nuisance..Hearing on the
Proposed Legislative Act, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 22, 1883, at 2; The Watuppa
Flats Nuisance. Hearing in Boston Yesterday, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1883,
at 2.
67. The Watuppa Flats Nuisance. Hearing on the Proposed Legislative Act, supra
note 66. Mayor Braley stated:
We are mulcted first for damages to pay for water in the ponds and then for
damages in this nuisance case and if we cannot get relief without paying for it,
we prefer to let it go.... Do they [the company] ~ot hold this right of flowage
subject to the police power of the Commonwealth and the demands of public
good?
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The Watuppa Flats Bill, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 5, 1883 at 2. See also
The Claims of the Reservoir Co., FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1883, at 2.
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thetic to the city,71 the bill, as finally passed, was "framed in the
interest of the Watuppa Reservoir Company rather than in that of
the city, and grant[ed] more to the company than they [had] asked
for."72
The right conveyed in the company's charter to flood the flats
did not include the option to ignore a public nuisance. The state,
possibly subjected. to pressure. from powerful mill interests, ap
peared to have eluded its responsibility to protect the public health.
As the company claimed the prerogatives of ownership, it should
have been held responsible, as any private owner traditionally
would have been, to abate a nuisance on its property. Possibly this
controversy contributed to the firm stance the court took against
the mills five years later.

v.

WATllPPA

1/

In March 1883, shortly after Watuppa I was decided, the Fall
River Daily Herald reported that the Board of Aldermen had au
thorized the mayor to "petition the legislature for such an act or
acts as may be necessary to secure the rights of the city under all
future condemnations of water in the Watuppa ponds for city and
public purposes."73 Three years later, the city successfully proposed
that the legislature amend the 1871 act to allow the city to draw an
additional 1,500,000 gallons daily.74 The amendment, in response to
Watuppa I, included a provision specifically denying the city's liabil
ity for damages other than those· "the state itself would be legally
71.

72.

The Watuppa Flats Bill, supra note 70.
The Watuppa Flats, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 19,1883, at 1. The bill, as

reported on the same page and approved the following June 16, provided that expenses
and damages would be paid out of the city treasury, with reimbursement through collec
tion of taxes. The city, however, had never been able to collect any taxes from the
reservoir company. The Watuppa Flats Nuisance. Hearing in Boston Yesterday, FALL
RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1883, at 2. As an article on April 19 stated, "[w]e see in
this bill a certain and extravagant expenditure of the public money with a very uncer
tain return of any portion of it." The Watuppa Flats, supra.
73. City Government. An Additional Appropriation of $25,000 Made to Meet the
Judgment in the Water Suits, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 6, 1883, at 1.
74. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, Before the Legislative Committee upon
Water Supply. In Behalf of the City of Fall River, Petitioner for an Act Granting it
Water From a Great Pond (May 18, 1886). Stetson alleged that thirty-two million gal
lons of water flowed from the ponds every day. Id. at 5. Not surprisingly, counsel for
the mills estimated the flow somewhat lower, at twenty-five million gallons. Brief for
Watuppa Reservoir Company and the Mills Constituting It at 10, Petition, supra note

48.
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liable to pay."75 The amendment continued: "Parties holding, in
respect of said pond, any privileges or grants heretofore made, and
liable to revocation or alteration by the state, shall have no claim
against said city in respect of water drawn under this grant. "76 The
amendment annulled "any privileges heretofore enjoyed in respect
of said pond," if inconsistent with the amended act.77 Governor
Robinson refused to sign the bill, on the grounds that the amend
ment authorized the taking of private property without providing
compensation, but it was passed over his veto.78
Again, the Watuppa Reservoir Company and the Troy Cotton
and Woolen Manufactory sued for an injunction to prevent the city
from diminishing their water power.79 The question presented was
whether the legislature could constitutionally authorize a city to ap
propriate the waters of a great pond for public purposes without
compensating owners of land or privileges on a stream flowing from
it. 80
In the arguments before the Legislative Committee on Water
Supply, the exchange of briefs that preceded the second case, and
the opinion itself, the defendant city relied upon the colony ordi
nance and case law which supported its devotion of the ponds to
public use and argued that the legislature's power to regulate public
rights was unlimited.81 Its counsel, Thomas Stetson, distinguished
75. 1886 Act, ch. 353, § 1, quoted in Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River
("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 469 (Mass. 1888).
76. 1886 Act, ch. 353, § 1, quoted in Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469.
77. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196.
78. [d. The governor also "felt that the act was an innovation and violation of
well established precedents." The Water Suits, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS,
Oct. 30, 1888, at 2. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
79. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196.
80. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 470.
81. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson supra note 48, at 3, 5, 27-29; Watuppa II, 18
N.E. at 466.
A leading case the city relied upon was West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7
Allen) 158 (1863). See supra part I. Stetson pointed out that the judge who wrote that
opinion, E. Rockwood Hoar, was now counsel for the company.
You know, gentlemen, that a member even of my profession, when paid by a
client, for a purpose, employed to contend for his claims and to argue for him,
does not always announce the law quite so safely and soundly as he would do
if holding the commission of the Commonwealth and sitting upon her Judicial
Bench. I propose, first therefore, to appeal from my brother Hoar arguendo
to Mr. Justice Hoar judicando, and to refer to that grand fortress of popular
right in these Great Pond subjects-the case of West Roxbury vs. Stoddard
.... He told you modestly that he had something to do with that case. Mod
esty has kept many a man from preferment. It shall be my office to see to it
that my friend's modesty shall not lose him now the well-earned fame to which
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between a direct invasion or appropriation of private property,
which would constitute a taking, and a consequential injury to pri
vate property that might result from legislative control of public
rights, which would not. 82 Stetson emphasized that water was then
of secondary importance to steam. 83 He claimed that every one of
the mills had "long since outgrown its waterpower, and ha[d] to
maintain two separate power plants. In fact about all the value left
it is to use it for a claim of damages whenever the public needs the
State's water."84 The mills and reservoir company had taken their
grants subject to the public rights in great ponds, and compensation
to them was not required. 85
The plaintiff company claimed that no case had ever held that
the waters of a great pond could be diverted by the state or anyone
to the detriment of a riparian proprietor on an outlet stream. 86 Its
lawyers sought to show that the ponds were part of a natural, con
stantly flowing watercourse, and therefore not governed by the or
dinance, but by the common law;87 thus, the state could not be
that cause entitles him. Do you know, gentlemen, he wrote it himself.... A
man may not disclaim his debts, nor will we allow Judge Hoar to disclaim the
fame and honor of such a decision.... Nobody ever could drive a horse-cart
through one of Mr. Justice Hoar's decisions.
Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, supra note 48, at 7-8. At least in this opinion, nobody
did.
82. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, supra note 48, at 7-8. This argument clearly
anticipated the modern regulatory takings dilemma.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 28. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
85. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, supra note 48, at 27-29; see also Watuppa II,
18 N.E. at 466-67.
86.
Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 11-12, Petition, supra note 48. The com
pany also accused the city of attempting to try questions that, in 1883, had already
"been tried before commissioners, the [s]uperior court and the [s]upreme court and
decided adversely to the city, but which the city fancies it finds some encouragment [sic]
in the opinion of the court in 134 Mass., [sic] 267 to try over again if it can secure this
Legislation." Id. at 23. The "encouragement" referred to may be found in the first
Watuppa ponds case, "[i]f there may be contingencies in which it might divert the wa
ters to the injury of persons owning water rights on the outlet without making compen
sation, it is clear that the Legislature has not claimed or asserted any such right in this
case." Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa I"), 134 Mass. 267, 269 (1883);
see also Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 468 (plaintiffs' counsel's argument).
87. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 468 (plaintiffs' counsel's argument). The company
admitted:
There may be great ponds with neither inlet [n]or outlet whose waters have
not been granted by the Legislature from which the Legislature might author
ize water to be taken without compensation to anyone. But in such a case the
waters of the pond form no part of a watercourse.
Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 12, Petition, supra note 48.
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allowed to divert the water to the detriment of a lower proprietor. 88
The company's charter was a contract between it and the state that
had vested water rights in the mills which the later legislative
amendment could not injure. 89 Further, although the company did
not deny that public needs must be satisfied when they arose, it
asserted that the act of 1886 was unconstitutional because it made
no provision for compensation. 90
In a four to three decision, the court dismissed the suit. 91 The
common law would indeed have required compensation for a dimi
nution in the flow of an ordinary stream, but the legislature was
entitled to grant these waters without paying riparian users because
the colony ordinance had devoted great ponds to public purposes.92
The ordinance was "universally accepted" and in force throughout
the entire state, even in regions that had originally not been within
the boundary of Massachusetts Bay Colony when it was enacted.93
No legal liability would be incurred for the deprivation because the
company's right to the waters of the ponds, although granted to it'
by the state, was "a qualified right, subject to the superior right of
the state to use the pond and its waters for other public uses."94
The legislature could also authorize cities or towns to exercise these
powers. 95 The opinion never mentioned the increasing importance
of steam power.
A dissent reiterated the argument that the ponds were part of a
natural watercourse, and saw no reason to treat streams flowing
from great ponds any differently from other streams. It maintained
that the ordinance should not be interpreted to limit riparian pro
prietors' right to a flow of water:
88. Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 11, Petition, supra note 48. To this point
the city claimed that at common law, riparian proprietors had the right only to "ordi
nary" use of water. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 468-69; see infra part V-B. Thus, even if the
ponds were a part of a watercourse, the city claimed the outcome should be in its favor.
89. Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 15-17, 20-22, Petition, supra note 48; see
also Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469.
90. Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 21-22, 28, Petition, supra note 48; see also
Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469.
91. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 474. One of the majority who voted against compensa
tion to the mills was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. He had been an associate justice of the
supreme judicial court since 1882, but was absent from the court when Watuppa [ was
decided.
92. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196-98; Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 472.
93. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 471 (listing Plymouth, Nantucket, Dukes County, and
Maine).
94. [d. at 472.
95. [d. See infra parts V-A, V-B.
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Can it be supposed that our forefathers, zealous as they were in
the encouragement of the erection of mills, intended by these pro
visions to take from individuals, without compensation,. rights
which they had acquired under previous grants to have water
flow through their lands forever?96
.

Furthermore, the dissent continued, the Commonwealth' had en
tered into a contract with the company through its corporate char
ter, and the rights it had granted in that document vested rights in
the company that could not be taken away without compensation
·
,
'
unless the charter was repealed. 97
As a result of Watuppa II, "a hue and cry has been raised that
the supreme court had struck a terrible blow at the manufacturing
interests of the state."98 The day of the decision,' the Boston Daily
Globe reported, "[i]t was claimed at the argument by plaintiff's
counsel that if the statute was constitutional it might result in Fall
River alone in the destruction of $3,40,000 worth of property with
'out the payment of $1."99 The Fall River Daily Evening News and
the Fal/River Daily Herald applauded the decisionYlO .
96. Watuppa II, 18 N,E. at 475-77 (Knowlton, J., dissenting). The italicized lan
guage refers to the Massachusetts Mill Acts, which froni 1713 and through many
amendments, insulated millers from lawsuits by landowners whose property had been
Hooded by dams. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI
CAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 47-52 (1977); OSCAR AND MARY F. HAND~IN, COMMON
WEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 12
16,71-78 (1969); STEINBERG, supra note 31, at 30-32; The Law of Water Privileges, 2
AM. JURIST 25 (1829); JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER
COURSES 664-81 (6th ed. i869); 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 32-34. Leading mill cases
include Fay v, Salem & Danvers Aqueduct Co., 111 Mass. 27.(1872); Paine v. Woods,
108 Mass. 160 (1871); Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467
(1832); Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick,) 68 (1831); Wolcott Woolen
Mfg. Co. v. Upham, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 292 (1827); and Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364
(1814).
97. Watuppa II, 18 N,E. at 479, As noted, the majority summarily dismissed the
plaintiff's argument on this point, saying that the state had not granted away the pub
lic's rights in the ponds by granting the corporate charter. Id. at 473.
98. Free Water for Towns, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 13, 1889, at 1. In
terestingly, the article went on to discuss the mills' inclination to try the case again:
There is talk of some one-sided trade between a king of the colonies and the
Piutes whereby a title was passed, which has been overlooked. If enough im
portance can be attached to the antique transaction, it is possible that the city
may be put to considerable expense in the future.
.
Id. See infra § VI.
99. Plenty of Water for All. Deemed a Wise Public Policy, BOSTON DAILY
GLOBE, Oct. 29, 1888, at 5 (evening ed.).
100. The Water Suits, supra note 78. The newspaper reported:
Citizens of Fall River will receive the judgment 'of the supreme judicial court
... with a grateful sense of relief and abiding confidence in its equity and
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The Fall River Daily Evening News stated that Fall River was
not the only city in the state that required water and had been dis
couraged from taking it by manufacturing interests. 10l In fact, after
the 1886 act was passed, similar powers had been granted to other
towns,l02 and soon legislation was proposed to codify and give gen
eral application to the holding of the case.
A.

The Proposed Water Bill

Shortly after Watuppa II, Representative Pratt of Abington in
troduced a bill into the legislature to extend the effects of the ruling
by general legislation. The Committee on Water Supply granted
hearings to "consider the expediency of giving to towns that now or
may hereafter take water from Great Ponds for domestic, fire and
other purposes the same rights in the waters of said ponds as the
Commonwealth now has."lo3 A few days later, on March 7, a Bos
ton .Dally Globe editorial entitled Danger to Manufactures ex
pressed its disgust for the opinion, the proposal, and its potential
effect on industry.l04
wisdom .... [T]he Legislature ... ha[s] only exercised the natural rights which
belong by the supreme law of public necessity, to every government which has
a right to protect its people. Any other decision would have been based upon
narrow technical grounds, and could not have stood the sifting test of public
thought and criticism.
[d. See also Another Victory. The Wautuppa [sic] Reservoir Company Beaten in Court,
FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Oct. 3D, 1888, at 1.
101. The Water Suits, supra note 78. The article stated:
Fall River is not alone in meeting the exorbitant claims of people who resist
public improvements and the general welfare of the community in a spirit
which challenges the entire body of citizenship to rebel against it. All over the
commonwealth there are places situated as Fall River is in relation to our
great ponds, heavily taxed as we are to maintain public improvements, who
will hail this decision as a signal and righteous interpretation of law in the
interest of public health and public justice.

102. The City. Hearing on Water Supply, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS,
Mar. 21, 1889, at 2 (naming Ashburnham, Maynard, Millbury, and New Bedford); see
also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 198 n.2 (adding Ayer and Malden); see infra
part V-B and text accompanying note 123.
103. Legislative Hearings, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 1,1889, at 6.
104. Danger to Manufactures, BOSTON DAILY GWBE, Mar. 7, 1889, at 4 (evening
ed.). The editorial read:
The manufacturing interests of Massachusetts are in great danger of being
crushed between an upper and a nether millstone. Already they are com
pelled to pay heavy taxes on all their raw materials and machinery. Already
they are forced to buy coal in Pennsylvania iristead of drawing from the
cheaper supply of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton. And now it is proposed to
deal them a still heavier blow, and allow the water power by which New Eng
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An editorial in the Fall River Daily Evening News related
Pratt's arguments and those of several opposing participants at the
March 12 hearing. lOS The damages section of the draft under dis-

Id.

land has attained her present position to be destroyed without making com
pensation to the ruined owners of the mills and factories dependent on it.
This is the true meaning of the insidioUs order introduced in the Legisla
ture some time since and referred to the water supply committee. ,Its language
is well calculated to conceal the true effect aimed at. Under the guise of giving
to towns that take or may hereafter take the water of large ponds the same
rights that the State now has in the waters of these ponds, it is really designed
to enable towns to drain every mill stream in the Commonwealth supplied by
such ponds, and 'to pay no damages for thus confiscating valuable property.
This is the true effect of the proposed bill, and no doubt its promoters are well
'aware of it. Whether the intended victims are equally well informed will be
seen at the hearing next Thesday.
.
It was generally supposed, until a few'months ago, that the Constitution
of Massachusetts afforded protection against an injustjce of this character. In
November [sic, the case was decided October 29], hoWever; the Supreme
Court ruled [in Watuppa 11] that because our forefathers had'decreed that the
great ponds should be open to the pilblic for fishing antJ fowling; therefore the
State was at liberty to do as it pleased with them regardless of any rights in
streams flowing from them. However sound this position may be in law, it
cannot affect the question of legislative action. This Commonwealth' cannot
afford to exact from its manufacturers all that it may be entitled to take. If the
ordinance of our ancestors is in favor of the proposed law,their practice at any
rate is against it; for prior to 1886 there was no instance of allowing a town to
take water without compelling it to pay damages. We think the rule laid down
by the court is more honored in the brel}ch than \n t~e observance, and depre
cate any legislation which, unjustly'encroacnes upon
private rights.
,
'

105. The Legislature. Great Po~ds, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 13,
1889, at 3. The paper reported:
The legislative committee on water supply yesterday gave a hearing on
the question of giving to towns the rights now held by the State in great
ponds....
. . . [Representative Pratt] wanted legislation on general principles to em
body the decision of the majority of the supreme court in the Fall River
Watuppa reservoir case. He argued that towns should be allowed to take
water from great ponds for domestic and fire purposes without compensation
for damages any more than the State itself would be liable. He did not believe
in private water companies, but, he would have cities and towns furnish them
selves with water. He had not included ~ities in the, bills because their, water
supply might necessitate so extensive a taking of water privileges as to be a
public calamity for which damages should be paid. But as the court has de
cided that the mill owners have' no vested rights in th~ waters of great ponds,
he would have that principle clearly laid down in statue [sic] law, so that towns
would not be liable for vexatious suits for damages.
Judge E.C..Bumpus, of Quincy, said that the supreme Court recently de
cided that when the towns take water they must pay damages to cover all time,
but these cases have gone back for retrial. He denied now that any retroactive
legislation could be passed, and ,claimed that the State could not give away
rights and then take them back. The poliCy of the State has been, as shown by
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cusslon provided that:
[N]o action for the recovery of damages arising out of the taking
or using by any town of the waters of a great pond shall be com
"menced or sustained by any littoral owner or riparian proprietor
on the shores of such pond or the bank of any stream flowing or
fed therefrom against a town so taking or using such waters. 106

This preclusive "language no doubt inflamed the mill owners and the
company still further.
Another hearing on the same bill was announced for March 20.
An editorial in the Boston Daily Globe that" morning, Save the
Ponds and Streams!, alleged that without the mills, thousands of
workers would be unemployed. 107 The evening editorial, Towns'
over 200 water acts, to have compensation made for water so taken. He said
he would submit a brief communication to the committee showing the reasons
why any retroactive legislation would be unconstitutional. From 1712 to the
present, legislation has been favorable to the mill ownerS.
H.G. Barker, of Cambridge, representing the Revere Copper Company,
said litigation was but just begun and urged that the Legislature should be
cautious and conservative in this matter. He claimed that when the State
granted ponds to towns, the grant included the land under the water. He be
lieved the State would not take away from the mill owners the rights already
given them. He further claimed that the mill owners have acquired now their
rights by undisturbed occupation and possession for a long term of years.
Id. Barker ultimately prevailed with his prescription theory in Attorney Gen. v. Revere
Copper Co., 25 N.E. 605 (Mass. 1890). This argument was not offered in Watuppa 11,
presumably because the company's charter was too recent to establish prescription. In
Revere Copper, the company showed that the mill and its predecessors in title had low
ered the height of the pond since 1770, a period of 120 years. Id. at 606. The reservoir
company had only been incorporated half as long. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River
("Watuppa I"), 134 Mass. 267, 269-70 (1883)
106. Free "Water for Towns, supra note 98.
107. Save the Ponds and Streams!, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1889, at 4
(morning ed.). The editorial stated:
There is another hearing at the State House today, beginning at 10 a.m.,
on the proposed cession cif the' State's rights in the ponds and water-ways to
the towns, within whose borders they are situated.
We have already called attention to the dangerous.character of this prop
osition. The water-ways belong to the, people of the State, and the people
would very soon lose all control over them if the State rights were given to the
towns; because many towns would sell or give away the exclusive right to the
ponds and streams. It would be most obnoxious to ordinary people to see a
pond or stream where the public from time immemorial has had the right to
row or fish, turned into the private property of some wealthy person. Besides,
many ponds would be dried up by those who covet the land they occupy; and
that would destroy the source of water supply for many a mill stream, which
would ruin many a vahiable plant and throw large numbers of working people
out of employment.
,
The Legislature must not be allowed to giVe away the State's right to the
water bodies-that is, the people's rights....:...without a vigorous protest.
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Water Supply-Mill Owners Who Want To Get Power Cheap, de
scribed what transpired at the hearing, where Louis D. Brandeis
presented the case for the company and its witnesses. lOS The Fall
River Daily Evening News reported the company's position to be
that the proposal "would do irreparable injury to mill privileges on
streams flowing out of great ponds, that private property would be
most unjustly confiscated, and the Watuppa decision was against
justice and still of doubtful authority."l09
The committee agreed on a general water supply bill to report
to the legislature on April 2. Its powers to take water were very
broad, and its provisions for paying compensation quite narrow,
although by no means as stringent as originally proposed. 110 This
bill only prohibited a suit until water had actually been diverted. It
Id.
108. Town's Water Supply. Mill Owners Who Want to Get Power Cheap, BOSTON
Mar. 20, 1889, at 2. (evening ed.): The newspaper reported:
'
The hearing on the order as to giving to towns taking their water from
great ponds the same rights 'as the State now has, brought out a large number
of mill owners and others at the morning's session of the committee on water
supply. Louis D. Brandeis had the conduct of the case for the remonstrants.
The speakers ... [a]ll spoke in remonstrance .... Mr. Herschel spoke of
the narrowness of the margin by reason of which the great paper milling inter
est of the Western part of the State is kept alive and of the danger of interler
ing with the present status of affairs. In the course of his evidence he spoke
favorably of the English system of compensating reservoirs, and said it could
only benefit communities and mill-owners, while no one could be harmed by
it.
'
James B. Francis of Lowell, an engineer and water-power expert, said that
the proposed legislation would bear hardly upon the smaller class of mill own
ers. Mr. Brandus [sic] then introduced the following as representing the lesser
mill interests: B.S. Binney of Shirley spoke of the fact that insecurity in the
matter of water powers within the State rendered it impossible to raise money
on many of them 'and thought that inasmuch as Massachusetts has no coal
supply, the State should exercise extreme caution in regard to interfering with
vested water rights.
.
F,W. Wood of Woodville was strenuously opposed to the proposed mea~
sure, as was also A.S. Morrison of Braintree. Mr. Brandus [sic] followed with
some remarks, in which he defended the remonstrants from the charge made
by Mr. Pratt [who proposed the bill] in his speech at the former hearing, that
they were "squatters." He went on to show the magnitude of the interests
involved by stating that there were over 1200 great ponds in the State with a
water acreage of 93,000 acres. The rights were the result of the confidence of
mill owners for over 200 years that the State would protect them in the out
come of their labor and foresight. What was proposed would be striking
blindly at many interests, and for reasons of a trivial nature.
Id. See infra § V-B. ,
109. The City., Hearing on Water Supply, supra note 102.
110. General Water Supply. Comprehensive Bill from the Committee, BOSTON
DAILY GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1889, at 3 (morning ed.).
DAILY GLOBE,
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did not pass, and on May 7 the House adopted the report of Bran
deis' cotnmittee. ll1 Despite an "energetic" defense by the defeated
An act to define the powers and duties of cities and' towns authorized to
supply their inhabitants with pure water.
Section 1. Any city or town hereafter authorized by the Legislature to
supply its inhabitants with pure water may, by such agency as the city or town
may determine, besides taking and holding the waters it is authorized to take,
also take and hold any water rights connected with such waters; may prevent
the pollution of said waters; may collect, store and convey said waters into said
city or town, and use and distribute and sell said waters to the inhabitants
thereof; may' construct and maintain dams, reservoirs, storage basins, drains,
conduits, pipes and aqueducts and erect buildings and machinery; may change
the course of any streams within the water-shed of its source of supply; may
carry any pipes, drains, conduits or aqueducts over or under any river, water
course, tide water, railroad, highway or other way; may enter upon and dig up
such road or way for the purpose of laying down, maintaining or repairing any
pipe, drain, conduit or aqueduct, and may from time to time take, by purchase
or otherwise, and hold any lands, rights or easements that said agency may
deem necessary for carrying out the purposes aforesaid.
Section 4. The city or town shall pay all damages that shall be sustained
by any person in property by such taking of any waters, lands, rights or ease
ments; and if any person sustaining such damage fails to agree with the city or
town as to the amount of damages sustained, such damage shall be assessed
and determined by a jury in the Superior Court for the county in which such
property is situated ... within three years of such taking ....
Section 5. No application shall be made to the court for the assessment of
damages for the taking of any water or water rights, or for any injury thereto
until the.water is actually withdrawn or diverted by the city or town; and any
person or corporation whose water rights may be thus taken or affected, may
make his application aforesaid at any time within three years from the time
when the waters shall be ~rst actually withdrawn or diverted.
[d.

Compare with the damages provision of the original bill, supra text accompanying
note 106.
111. House Debates'the Elevator Bill and Great Pond Rights, BOSTON DAILY
GLOBE, May 7, 1889, at 8. The Boston Daily Globe reported an opposition speech by
"Johnson of Haverhill":
For 250 years ... the citizens of Massachusetts have, under encouragement
from the General Court, built up by their own enterprise, unaided by the
State, the flourishing mills, villages and towns on the streams in this Common
wealth. A large proportion, if not all, of these streams have their source or are
fed by great ponds.
Yet the gentlemen in the sixth division presents [sic] a bill here today
which would take from the mills that support of nature which enables them to
hold their position.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I~t us for a few minutes consider what the effect would
be if this bill were passed. You see the bill gives to towns the right to take the
waters of a great pond to be used for any purpose (not alone for domestic or
fire purpose), without giving any compensation to the riparian proprietor or
littoral owner on the shores of such pond or along the lines of streams flowing
therefrom, or, in other weirds, to the manufacturer [sic], who use and own the
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bill's sponsor, it was "characterized a revolutionary bill, and was
rejected by a decisive vote. "112
Additional factors that influenced this vote will be discussed in
the following sections, but even on its face it seems a correct resolu
tion. The balancing of interests necessary to resolve controversial
issues of this kind is usually more successful in a state legislature
where all sides have an opportunity to debate, than when delegated
to less diverse and potentially even more self-interested govern
mental units. 113
B.

The Exchange of Articles in Harvard Law Review

Meanwhile, shortly after the second case was decided in Octo
ber 1888, and at the same time as the debate on the water bill pro
posal, three consecutive law review articles elaborated upon
Watuppa II's majority and dissenting arguments in response to the
bill. Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel Dennis Warren, Jr., wrote the
first and third, and Thomas Stetson, a lawyer for Fall River in
Watuppa I and II, the second.
Warren was a close friend and former classmate of Brandeis' at
Harvard Law School and a member of a prominent New England
family with extensive paper mill holdings. After graduating, he had
practiced with a Boston firm, Shattuck, Holmes & Munroe, in
which Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was a partner. Warren per
suaded Brandeis to return east from St. Louis, suggesting that they
take advantage of his business and social contacts and form a part
nership.114 They formed Warren & Brandeis in 1879, and in that
water power of the streams. You see, Mr. Speaker, that it is no "picayunish"
interest that would be affected by the passage of this bill. On the contrary: it
would be detrimental, if not ruinous, to all the manufacturing interests of the
Commonwealth that are in any way dependent on water for power, and it is a
fact, Mr. Speaker, that one-half of the power used in Massachusetts today is
water power.
You will find that it is not the mill owners alone that will be affected. It is
not the mill owner who is proprietor of the stores and houses in most instances
in the community where the mill is established, but the value of these stores
and houses is dependent upon the prosperity of the mill and when you strike a
blow at the mills you strike a blow at all the industries in the town.
In the language of one of the remonstrants at the hearing before the com
mittee, and by the way, the gentleman was not a mill owner, "such action
would seem to be an extreme case of State robbery such, as if done by an
individual, the State would consider a penitentiary offence."

Id.
112.

The Legislature, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, May 8, 1889, at 3.
See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
114. ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 54-55 (1946) (citing a

113.
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year Warren introduced Brandeis to his old boss, Holmes. The
three often met socially, before Holmes was appointed to the
supreme judicial court, and became close friends.u s In 1888, War
ren's father died and he left the practice to assume control of the
family business. 116 After that, the firms shared offices in the same
building so the former partners could still see each other on a regu
lar basis.u 7
.
It was Warren's idea that they should share the editorship of a
law review to be started at Harvard. lls Brandeis eventually became
a trustee and the law review's first treasurer. 119 They contributed
money, advice, and three jointly written articles. At Warren's sug
gestion, the first two concerned the Watuppa Pond cases,120 to
Which Brandeis referred in a letter of March 20, 1889:
We are having a Water fight now which is quite as warm as the
rag fight was a few years ago, with the advantage however of the
Community being with us, instead of prima facie against us. I
have been making public opinion by wholesale. The press is full
of our editorials, the law reviews of our articles, & before the
legislative committee on Water Supply we have had two hearings
& another comes Monday.121
letter dated May 30, 1879 from Brandeis to Warren}; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LoUIS D.
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 4 (1981); STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF
LAWS AND LIMrrATIONS: AN INTELLEcruAL PORTRAIT OF LoUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS
75 (1994).
115. MASON, supra note 114, at 63-64, 570; 1 LETTERS OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS 39
(Meivin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971).
See also MASON, supra note 114, at 571, for the influence Brandeis later wielded
over Holmes when the two were justices of the United States Supreme Court.
116. 1 LETTERS OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 115, at 77 n.1.
117. ALLON GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON 12 (1980); BRANDEIS, supra note 115, at
77-78 (citing a letter from Brandeis to his brother Alfred, March 20,1889, after Warren
had left the firm).
118. MASON, supra note 114, at 54; "HALF BROTHER, HALF SON," THE LETTERS
OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 569 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W.
Levy eds. 1991). Warren had written to Brandeis, "I regard [Holmes] as the greatest
American thinker in law ... I think we will make our discussions triangular with some
benefit all around." [d.
119. MASON, supra note 114, at 67-68; BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 78.
120. See ALFRED LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
IDEAL 50-51 (1936).·
The last and vastly more famous article was The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (189O), inspired by the socially prominent Warren's resentment at having his private
life discussed in newspaper society columns after he married the daughter of the ambas
sador to Britain. LIEF, supra at 51. See also Philippa Strum, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PRO
GRESSIVISM 135 & n.65 (1993); BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 82-88.
121. 1 LETTERS OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 115, at 78.
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Sounding the theme of settled expectations, their first law re
view article, dated December 15, 1888, was incensed over the dan
gers to mill owners in a "great manufacturing community," who had
expended capital in reliance upon the uninterrupted flow of water
and built factories "upon nearly every stream in Maine and Massa
chusetts, which [was] favorably situated and capable of furnishing
water-power."122 As previously mentioned, Fall River's 1886 water
act was immediately followed by statutes granting to cities and
towns the same right that the state had, to appropriate water from
great ponds without paying compensation. As a result of the pas
sage of these statutes, Brandeis and Warren envisioned a wide
spread curtailment of waterpower. 123 They strongly asserted that
compensation should be paid to mill owners and examined state
cases in detail for support.124
John Henry Wigmore, autho,r of A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICJ\N SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, told the following story:
"A few months after'l was admitted to the bar, 1 was going along Wash
ington Street, Boston (I remember almost the very place), one Monday, when
1 met Louis Brandeis. (He was then known as the 'young Choate' of the Bos
ton Bar). He said to me, 'Do you want to earn $1001' Suppressing a near
faint, 1 answered, 'Most hungrily 1 do.' He said, 'I am counsel for some mills
and must argue next week before· a legislative Committee against a bill to
condemn all public lakes in Massachusetts for municipal water supplies.
Before Saturday night, 1 must know what is the total potential water power
available from Massachusetts lakes.' 'But,' 1 said, 'where does it tell what the
totai is?' He answered, 'Nobody knows; that is just the point.' 'Well,' 1 asked,
'tell me how to figure it out, at least.~ He answered, 'I don't know how. And 1
haven't got time to find out. That is why 1 employ you.' 'Well,' 1 said, 'I would
do blinder things than that for $100. Next Saturday night, you said?' 'Yes,' he
ended, 'results by next Saturday.' You can imagine what 1 went through, that
week. But I had to find out, and I did find out."
WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 15 (1977)
(quoting Wigmore, "Independent Research Work," 2. Remarks to the Northwestern
University Law School Class of 1915 (Wigmore Collection». Brandeis actually paid
Wigmore $50 more than he had offered, and said it was for "your very valuable services
in the great pond question." Id. (citing letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Wigmore,
April 2, 1889 (Wigmore Collection». In a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., on Feb.
6, 1916 (the year Brandeis was appointed associate justice of the Supreme Court), Wig~
more wrote that he considered this his first genuine retainer. Id.
, In contemporary dollars, $150 was approximately equivalent to $6400, a considera
ble sum for a week's work, even today. See supra note 28.
For the "rag fight," see STRUM, supra note 120, at 17.
122. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 198.
123. See Warren & Brand~is, supra pote 26, at 198 n.2; see also Watuppa Reser
voir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 473 (Mass. 1888). Other towns were
said to have been holding off until Watuppa II was decided before proposing such legis
lation. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 198 n.2 See supra notes 101-03 and ac
companying text. ,
124. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 202-11. 1\vo Maine cases were in
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They argued that riparian owners on a stream ("whatever its
source") were traditionally entitled to the natural flow of water
without diminution, subject to the reasonable use of the proprietors
above. 125 Thus, mills on rivers flowing from great ponds deserved
no different treatment. The rights of riparian owners were property
within the meaning of the Constitution, and not even for a public
purpose could the legislature deprive mills of the flow of water
without paying compensation. 126 They asserted, as the Watuppa II
dissent had,127 that the state had no exceptional rights to great
ponds under the ordinance, which only reserved them to towns for
public use. 128
A private land owner whose property completely surrounded a
small pond, with no outlet stream, owned it completely and could
do what he liked with the water. But if the pond had an outlet, if it
was "a link in a chain through which water made its course from the
Ipountains to the sea,"129 he would only have the reasonable use of
the water and could not divert ·or destroy it. The state's rights in
great ponds with outlet streams could be no better.13o The public
right to such ponds only extended to its use of the water as a pond,
not to. ownership of the water itself.131
Brandeis and Warren concluded:
It is a wide departure from the spirit which has in the past led the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts to foster its manufacturing in-.
dustries by every means in its power, and the decision is to be
regretted especially, because it comes at a time when all the re
straints imposed by the Constitution and the courts are needed to
protect private property from the encroachments of the
Legislature. 132
In almost immediate response, Stetson's article of February 15,
cJuded in the examination, as the ordinance was also a part of that state's law. Id. at
209.

125. Id. at 198-99.
126. Id. See also STEINBERG, supra note 31, at 140-41 (discussing the difficulties
the law encountered rationalizing the concept of running water as property).
127. 18 N.E. at 475-77.
128. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 202.
129. Id. at 200.
130. Id. at 200-02, 211. Brandeis and Warren took issue only with the public's
"right to destroy" the ponds, not with its right to use them or with the legislature's right
to regulate their uses. Id. at 211.
.
131. Id. at 210-11.
132. Id. at 211; see supra note 96 and accompanying text regarding the mill acts,
.
and infra notes 224-53 and accompanying text.
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1889, took issue with the claim that the ponds were part of a water
course. 133 He did not contest the cornmon law rights of riparian
owners, but denied that title to running water could be extended to
these ponds' assertedly still waters. l34 The law of lakes and not the
law of watercourses had to apply to water that did not flow,even if
the lake had an outlet stream; and no rule prohibited the diversion
of still water. 135 to apply the cornmon law to great ponds "would
be a hypothecation forever of these' glorious free public reservoirs,
to pay claims of mill-sites'and bank-owners."136 For the majority in
Watuppa II and this author, the "colonial wisdom" of the ordinance
made it unnecessary for the public to "pay for its water to the
miller"; principles of . "loftier utility" controlled in' the
Commonwealth. 137
Brandeis and Warren's April 15 rebuttal 138 alleged that there
was a "slight current" near the channel into the south pond and the
point at which the city took water was a short distance away; only
the body of the pond was still.139 The ponds' perceptible current
entitled them to be classified as a watercourse. Distinguishing the
degree of flow required might be "unpractical and unscientific," but
they asserted that the Watuppa ponds met the requirements. l40
The "private ownership of water-power". had been unques
tioned in Massachusetts until these cases; no "paramount right of
the public" to water power had been recognized until the 1886
act.141 True, the ordinance had predated the Constitution, and, de
spite its limitation on private property, admittedly could have been
transformed into a settled rule of property through, long compli
ance. However, the common law had prevailed instead, and it now
defied both common law and constitutional principles to "extend by
forced interpretation an ancient ordinance to a new application
subversive of a well established and long undisputed rule of
property."142
133. Thos. M. Stetson, Great Ponds, 2 HARV. L. REV. 316, 316-17 (1889).
134. Id. at 320.
135. Id. at 324-25.
136. Id. at 320.
137. Id. at 330-31.
138. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1889) [hereinafter The Law of Ponds).
.
139. Id. at 3.
140. Id. at 18.
141. Id. at 9 n.l. This argument, reiterates that of the Watuppa II dissent,
Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 478 (Mass. 1888)
.'
(Knowlton, J., dissenting).
142. The Law of Ponds, supra note 138, at 9 n.1, 22.
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Brandeis and Warren ultimately won this debate when the gen
eral water bill was defeated on May 7, but perhaps not entirely for
the reasons they expressed. A strict application of tpe colony ordi
nance, such as their opponents Stetson, Representative Pratt, and
the Watuppa II majority advocated, would never account for water
once it flowed from a great pond, ~s it did in many instances. 143 But
the mill acts, whose pro-industry spirit Brandeis and Warren and
the Watuppa II dissent invoked, simply immunized mills somewhat
against suits by proprietors whose land was flooded and did not by
themselves grant rights to the flow of water or guarantee compensa
tion to mills in the eve.nt of a diminution,144 The common law
would have provided damages for the mills, but there· was no appar
ent way to apply it. Given these choices, the problem seemed insol
uble. The proper balance among these competing interests was by
no means clear, and whether the ponds had a current was too de
batable a point upon which to rest a resoJution; it had, after all, lost
. .
.
in Watuppa II.
. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, whom Brandeis and Warren
credited with resurrecting the ordinance in this context,145 had ad
dressed a similar situation almost forty years earlier in. dicta. In
Cummings v. Barrett, mill tenants on a stream that originated in a
great pond claimed the exclusive right to control all of its water;
they sought to enjoin the cutting and taking of ice from the pond,
which might deplete the amount of water they needed to power
their mills. l46 Shaw wrote:.
We are not aware that [the colony ordinance] has ever been al
tered. What the rights are of adjacent or riparian owners of land
bordering on such ponds, has, we believe, never been the subject
of adjudication or discussion.... But in the advanced state of
agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and with the increased
value of land and all its incidents, there will probably be hereaf
ter increased importance to the question, whether and to what
extent such riparian proprietors have a right to the use of the
waters, for irrigating land, for steam-engines, for manufactories
which require a large consumption of water, and for the supply of
their own icehouses, for delivery to neighbors, and for more dis
tant traffic.
In a case between the owners of a mill with the privilege of a
143.
144.
145.
146.

See supra § I.
See supra note 96 ~nd sources cited therein.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 202-03.
64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 186, 187 (1852).
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mill stream, and the riparian owner of land, on a large pond, sup
plying such mi~l stream, the nearest analogy perhaps, and that is
apparently a strong one, is to that of riparian proprietors, on a
running stream.147

Apparently this celebrated justice would have agreed with Brandeis
and Warren and allowed the common law rule to regain its vitality
.
once water left agreat pond.
At the same time as the debate on the water bill, a strike in Fall
River highlighted the mills' importance to an increasinglyindustri
alized and complex community.
C.

The Fall River Weavers' Strike

In 1884, the Fall River mills cut the wages of all laborers by
twenty percent on the ground that the Democratic administration,
led by Grover Cleveland, might reduce the tariff. After he tried to
. do so and failed, the mills rescinded the pay cuts for all classes of
labor except one. Five years later the weavers, the poorest paid and
least skilled workers in the mills, were still ten percent short of their
1884 salaries, despite the election of Benjamin Harrison, a Republi
can who advocated a high tariff.l48 The weavers requested several
times that the Manufacturers' Board of Trade restore their wages,
to no avail.t 49 The manufacturers claimed that the weavers had not
recouped their 1884 salaries because they had been better paid than
other mill workers 150 and, at salaries averaging eight dollars a week,
the weavers were as well paid in Fall River as anywhere. 151 At
tempts to negotiate failed, and on March 12, 1889, a front page
headline in the Boston Daily Globe read: Silent Looms. Fall River
147. Id. at 188. .
148. Editorial, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1889, at 4 (morning ed.); No
Signs of Weakening. Staying Powers of Wellvers To Be Tested Today, BOSTON DAILY
GLOBE, Mar. 19, 1889, at 5 (morning ed.).
149. Philip T. Silvia, Jr., The Spindle City: Labor, Politics, and Religion in Fall
River, Massachusetts, 1870-1905, at 464-65 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Fordham University (New York)); Weavers' Meeting, An Increas~ of Wages Asked,
FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Jan. 30, 1889, at 2. Only 300 of 7000 weavers
attended the meeting although the attempt to organize had been ongoing for a year,
since January 1888, when the last general raise was given and the weavers felt slighted.
Labor's Battle. Beginning of the Great Strike for More Wages, FALL RIVER DAILY HER
ALD, Mar. 11, 1889, at 4.
.
150. Weavers and Spinners. The Former Threaten a Strike, FALL RIVER DAILY
EVENING NEWS, Feb. 28, 1889, at 2; The Weavers, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS,
Mar. 7, 1889, at 2.
15l. Will Strike Monday. '. So the Carrollton Hall Meeting Decides, FALL RIVER
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1889, at 2.
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Weavers Begin the Battle. General Surprise at the Number Enlisted.
Seven Thousand Already Engaged in the Struggle. Determination
the Watchword of Leaders. Manufacturers Sanguine of Ultimate
Victory.152 Never in all of Fall River's many mill strikes had so
many workers left at one time,153 but the manufacturers were un
concerned because of an oversupply of weavers.154
The spinners' union was one of th~ strongest labor organiza
tions in the country; it was well organized and recognized by the
manufacturers. The weavers, however, had failed to establish a
union until this strike, primarily because their large number (almost
ten thousand) included men, women, and children. They were not
as easy to control or mobilize as the spinners, whose union had only
about eight hundred adult male members. 155 The weavers also
tended to be indifferent to trade unionism, a problem that plagued
them for years. 156
When the new union ordered the-strikers to avoid trouble and
stay away from the mills, however, its orders were obeyed. 157 The
spring weather was good lmd the strike was almost a vacation to
workers accustomed to "the stuffy, noisy weave rooms inside the
grim looking mills."158 Between four and five thousand strikers at
tended a meeting in the piuk. 159 Spirits were high, and the weavers'
152. Silent Looms. Fall River Weavers Begin the Battle, supra note 28.
153. [d. The local papers claimed that even more weavers were on strike, 8000 to
9000, and that 80% to 90% of the city's 45,000 looms were still. All Out. Weavers Very
Generally Obey the Order to Strike, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 11, 1889,
at 2 . '
.
Fall River experienced greater labor unrest than other Massachusetts manufactur
ing centers. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY,
1830-1900, at 96-97 (1982), which cites a contemporary politician's conclusion that the
power the unions wielded encouraged concern only with self-interest by both workers
and employers. Each side, therefore, was more inclined to use heavy-handed tech
niques to achieve its goals, unlike other cities where mutual concern and the spirit of
negotiation were paramount.
154. Silvia, supra note 149, at 466; All Out. Weavers Very Generally Obey the
Order to Strike, supra note 153.
155. Labor's Hosts in Line. Weavers to Test Their Strength Today, BOSTON DAILY
GLOBE, Mar. 11, 1889, at 1 (morning ed.) ..
156. Silvia, supra note 149, at 470-74.
157. Silent Looms. Fall River Weavers Begin the Battle, supra note 28.
158. All Merry. Fall River Weavers in Holiday Attire Fill the Streets and Public
Parks, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1889. On Wednesday the headline read, Few
Knobsticks. More Weavers Desert Their Looms. The Great Strike Becomes Contagious.
Out of a Total of 9000, only 310 Remain at Work. 42,000 Looms Cease Their Busy
Clatter. Secretary Connelly Well Pleased with the Outlook. BOSTON DAILY GLOBE,
Mar. 13, 1889, at 8 (morning ed.).
159. Labor's Battle. Beginning of the Great Strike for More Wages, supra note
149; All Out. Weavers Very Generally Obey the Order to Strike, supra note 153.

60

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:29

only terms were "unconditional surrender."l60 But the strike had
been ordered with an almost empty treasury and no means to sup
port thousands of weavers; the lack of sound leadership. was appar
ent within the first few days.161
A connection was swiftly made between the strike and the pro
posed general water bill. A Boston Daily Globe editorial entitled
The Title to Ponds and Streams appeared the next morning-the
day of the hearing before the water supply committee-predicting
the demise of the mills and the jobs they provided and pleading
with people of all political beliefs to protect the rights of the mill
owners.162 The strike also got somber treatment in the local papers.
The Fall River Daily Evening News pleaded that "appeals to preju
dice and passion should be avoided" given the seriousness of the
massive unemployment to the community, whether voluntary or in
160. Few Knobsticks. More Weavers Desert Their Looms, supra note 158.
161. The Third Day of the Strike, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 13,
1889, at 2.
162. The Title to Ponds and Streams, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1889, at 4
(morning ed.). The editorial read:
Many valuable mills in this State and many thousands of working people
are dependent upon water power. All who are interested in any way in main
taining the water supply in the mill streams or elsewhere should attend the
hearing at the State House beginning at 10:30 today, to show cause why the
pending resolve relating to the ponds and streams of the State should not be
adopted.
All rights in the lakes and rivers of Massachusetts are now vested in the
State. But it is proposed to give to the towns all the rights which the State
possesses in the lakes, ponds and streams within those towns. The effect
would be to enable any town to dry up any pond within its borders, and with it
any mill stream that may take its rise in these waters, without any compensa
tion to the owners of mills, whose plant would be ruined, or to the working
people who would be thrown out of employment.
The just and proper title to the water ways and water bodies rests in the
Commonwealth. So it has always been, and so it should remain. The State
will make the gravest mistake if it lets its ancient rights - which are merely
the ancient rights of the people - go out of its hands or divide them with
towns or individuals. If that is done it will not be long before the people at
large will have lost all control of the water of their State, as they have of the
land: for many towns will sell or give away the exclusive right to sources of
water supply.
This is a matter of so much importance, both to the large milling interests
of the present time and to future generations, that the people, without regard
to party, should make themselves heard and felt in relation to it. No legislator
who values popular rights, as handed down from the colonial days, or who
regards the great manufacturing interests, ought to vote for such a measure.
Id. See supra part V-A. Despite the claim Brandeis made in his March 20 letter, see
supra text accompanying note 121, this editorial and the others cited in part V-A were
all anonymous.
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voluntary, and the importance of an expeditious solution. 163
The strikers received support from weavers in other towns,164
but other departments within the Fall River mills operated as usual.
The spinners, for example, knew that the yarn they spun was being
sold at a profit to other businesses in New England. As long as they
worked, the weavers had no hope of causing the manufacturers any
economic distress. 165 Indeed, "manufacturers, so far from being
alarmed at the prospect of a loss of earnings . . . regard [ed] the
strike with philosopical [sic] serenity as an unavoidable incident,
like the break-down of the machinery of a mill."166
The mills refused an attempt by the state board of arbitration
to arrange a meeting between the parties,167 because to recognize
the new union would perpetuate an ongoing threat. 168 They swore
they would not raise salaries no matter how long the strike lasted169
and continued to assert that they paid higher wages for weaving
than other manufacturing centers.17° The board and the manufac
turers' committee, however, did agree that if the weavers went back
to work first they might negotiate. 171 The arbitrators requested that
the weavers do so for three months at their old wages while the
state studied the situation. The Weavers' Association Committee
reported the proposal to the executive committee and it was quickly
The Strike, FALL RNER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 13, 1889, at 2.
164. Way Not Paved Toward an Amicable Settlement of the Fall River Strike. State
Arbitrators a Little Premature in Believing Progress Had Been Made, BOSTON DAILY
163.

GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1889, at 1 (evening ed.).
165. All Out. Weavers Very Generally Obey the Order to Strike, supra note 153;
The Third Day of the Strike, supra note 161; Silvia, supra note 149, at 467-68.
166. A Word to the Weavers, FALL RNER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 16, 1889,
at 2.
167. The Fourth Day. Weavers Hold a Variety Show on the Park, FALL RNER
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 14, 1889, at 2.
168. Will Not Go Back. Striking Weavers Refuse to Compromise, BOSTON DAILY
GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1889, at 5 (morning ed.); Unionism Ignored. Weavers May Apply for
Work as Individuals, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 17,1889, at 1 (Sunday ed.); Decline
to Arbitrate. Weavers' Committee Reject the Offer of the State Board, FALL RNER
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 16, 1889, at 2.
169. The Fourth Day. Weavers Hold a Variety Show on the Park, supra note 167.
170. The Strike, supra note 163. The FALL RNER DAILY EVENING NEWS
reported:
It is said that Lowell pays 20 cents for a cut of 50 yards, which would be at the
rate of 18 cents for 45 yards, for which Fall River pays 19 cents, or a cent in
favor of the Fall River weaver over the Lowell weaver. It is held also that in
Lowell a weaver is not allowed as many looms as in Fall River, and that the
average wages of weavers there will not exceed $7 per week.

Id.
171.

Id.
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rejected. 172 On this, the fifth day of the strike, nine thousand weav
ers were out of work.173
The following week,174 the weavers' committee suggested that
the strikers might return to work if the manufacturers gave a tokep.
raise of five percent in the meantime, pending a settlement by the
board of arbitration. 175 The mill owners refused arid only repeated
their earlier of(erP6 The Thursday ·evening, Boston Daily Globe
reported:
The manufacturers have shown their teeth, and by refusing to
arbitrate have practiCally paralyzed all the industries of the city.
The·complaints uttered against the corporations this morning are
loud and long. All the traders, and every person who depends
upon the pr()sperity of the city at large for his living, are making
bitter complaints. They say that the mill owners are pigheaded,
and that their refusal to submit to the terms offered by the State
board of arbitration has put machinery in motion that. will cost
the city a million of money before it can be stoppedP7

Seventy thousand people lived in Fall River, all of them depen
dent in one way or another on the mills; between twelve and twenty
thousand workers had been put out of work by the strike. 178 The
172.
Unionism
173.
174.

Will Not Go Back. Striking Weavers Refuse to Compromise, supra note 168.
Ignored. Weavers May Apply for Work as Individuals, supra note 168.
Will Not Go Back. ,Striking Weavers Refuse to Compromise, supra note 168.
No Signs of Weakening, supra note 148. According to this article, the strike
now included 15,000 people, about 10,000 of whom were weavers. The Strike. The
Situation But Little Changed from Last Week, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar.
19,1889, at 2;A Question of Endurance. No Arbitration, No Compromise., FALL RIVER
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 21, 1889, at 2.
175. Futile Officiousness, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 20, 1889, at 2;
Another Proposition to Arbitrate, Fall River Daily Evening News, Mar. 20, 1889, at 2; A
Question of Endurance. No Arbitration, No Compromise, supra note 174.
176. Will it Avail? Weavers Persuaded to Arbitrate, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar.
20, 1889, at 1 (morning ed.).
The manufacturers were adamant:
The agreement which the weavers had condescended to make would not re
ceive the slightest notice from the board of trade. We will make no concession
of anything, and if the weavers are willing to return to work on the old basis,
we may then consider the advisability of leaving the' question of wages to the
Board of Arbitration for investigation.... We are now paying the highest
wages, and we will pay no more. We will fight this strike to the end, even if it
lasts six months.
Another Proposition to Arbitrate, supra note 175.

177.

To Count the Cost of the Cotton Kings' Obstinacy Reveals Some Ugly Facts,

BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1889, at 5 (evening ed.).
178. A Word to the Weavers, supra note 166 (estimating the number of people out
of work at 20,000); The Eleventh Day. Convincing Proof that Wages Could Be Raised,
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fledgling weavers' union had managed to keep all but two thousand
of the forty-five thousand looms idle for over two weeks, with little
or no violence, despite "all the might of capital, and all the dread of
poverty combined.... It was a wonderfulachievement."179 . But
more and more weavers were returning to work every day,lSO and
the Fall River Daily Evening News begged them to admit defeat. 18l
On March 27, .partly due to the efforts of a local minister, the
front page headlines read, Battle Over. The Fall River Weavers
Yield To Starvation's Gaunt Spectre. They Vote to Return To
morrow. Decision o/the Executive Committee. Causes a Murmur at
the Park, Until Good Parson Brown Appears. He Persuades the
Strikers to Acquiesce. 182 The state board of arbitration would con
tinue its investigation and the union would attempt· to gain
strength,183 but the weavers went back at their old wages. "All was
lost but honor," the Boston Daily Globe claimed. l84 The Fall River
Daily Evening News took a more qualified view. Each weaver lost
$20 to $25, for a total gain to the mills of over $300,000 in wages not
paid for fifteen days. The market for cloth actually improved from
the· lack of production, which further benefitted the
manufacturers. l85
Mayor Jackson of Fall River spoke at several of the legislative
hearings on the proposed general water bill.186· The mayor, predict
ably, defended the principle of the 1886 act that had benefitted his
city with free water. He also expressed the belief that individual
cases should be evaluated as they arose, and opposed the general
.'

FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD,

Mar. 22, 1889, at 4 (estimating the number at 12,000

15,000).

179. But Just Begun. Half a Million Sunk in the Weavers' Strike,

BOSTON DAILY

Mar. 26, 1889, at 1 (morning ed.). The relatively few mills in operation were
operated mostly by unskilled children, who took "advantage" of the strike to learn the
trade. ld.
GLOBE,

180. How Long Will it Last? Signs of Uneasiness Among the Weavers,
RrvER DAILY EVENING NEWS,

181. Set the Looms in Motion, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING
.
1889, at 2.
182. BOSTON DAiLY GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1889, at 1 (evening ed.).

183.

The Strike Ended. Weavers Vote to Return To-Morrow,

EVENING NEWS,

FALL

Mar. 22, 1889, at 2.
NEWS,

Mar. 22,

FALL RIVER DAILY

Mar. 27, 1889, at 2.

184. Battle Over. The Fall River Weavers Yield to Starvation's Gaunt Spectre,
supra note 182.
185. The Strike and Its Results, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 28,
1889, at 2. In 1989 dollars, the weavers lost between $853 and $1066.25; the total wages
lost would be approximately $12,795,000. See supra note 28.
186. See supra part V-A.
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bill. l87 His lack of support may have been crucial to ~he bill's defeat
and may seem perplexing without the perspective that the weavers'
strike, which ended Marcil 27, gives to his point of view. The manu
facturers' expectations, that the common law and their corporate
charters gave them rights to the flow of streams, encouraged them
to invest in their factories with confidence and provide jobs for the
many thousands of workers un~mployed in Fall River at the same
time as the bill was debated.·
..
.
. VI.

WATUPPA

Iff

Watuppa II remained a problem for the mills. In 1891, the Fall
River Evening News reported complaints about the high rates that
were being charged for the city water. Some citizens solved the
problem by drilling artesian wells. One company altered.a natural
ravine through which a stream flowed so that it would function as a
reservoir from which the· company could ·lay pipes to itsmills. l88
187. Water Supply of Cities. Legislative Hearing, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS,
Apr. 25, 1889, at 1. The newspaper repoited:
The bill before the committee, Thursday, is one prep·ared in the interest of
manufacturing corporations and of the city of .Boston; it was a general bill
regulating the water supply of cities and towns, and had in it the old provisions
relating to the payment of damages, 'against which the city has successfully
fought in the Legislature and the· courts within the last few yearS.
The mayor; iIi his argument before the committee Thursday, presented
the same line of argument adopted by.him at the other hearings as to general
legislation-that cases should always be treated individually-the circum- .
stances surrounding them, the diversity of rights was such that no general bill
that was just and equitable could be passed at the present day; that the
splendid property of the State in its ponds was a wealth that the Legislature
should protect with the greatest prudence; that whenever interested parties
presented their claims before the Legislature on the one side, and the people
their claims on the other, full opportunity should be given both sides to be
heard, and no surrender made prematurely by general legislation to anybody;
that the wisdom which had characterized the legislation, and which had re
served the ponds for uses not known, should be alike displayed by this Legisla
ture in preserving, without gift to anybody, this great public property for
whatever uses the future might bring forth. Replying to strictures made by the
attorney of manufacturing interests against the legislation which Fall River
had obtained, the mayor spoke strongly and forcibly in defense of its justice
and equity.
Id. See also The City. Hearing on Water Supply, supra note 102; Water From Great
Ponds, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 26, 1889, at 3; Water Supplies for
Cities and Towns, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 4, 1889, at 2.
188. Cheaper Water Supply. Border City Mills Will Get .Its Water from Steep
Brook, FALL RIVER EVENING NEWS, Aug. 26, 1891, at 8.
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That year the reservoir company brought the case back to court. 189
To employ· the common law to protect the rights of the mill
owners, the ponds had to be excluded from the scope of the ordi
nance, which, as interpreted in Watuppa II, enabled Fall River to
take the. ponds' water without compensation. Watuppa II had
stated confidently that the ordinance was in force throughout the
entire state,l90 despite its not having been "extend[ed] to those
places by any positive enactment now known."191 In Watuppa III,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who had agreed with the majority in
the second case that no compensation was due, now found for the
mills based on an interpretation of new evidence that finely distin
guished the state-wide application of the ordinance. l92
The modem state of Massachusetts was formed by the union of
two colonies, Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, in 1692. 193 Fall
River was in the part of the state· which had been Plymouth, but
Massachusetts Bay had enacted the ordinance. In 1656 and 1680,
while still independent, Plymouth had conveyed to private individu
als, plaintiffs' predecessors in title, two large tracts of land; these
"time-stained deed[s]" had apparently been forgotten. 194 The first
grant, the "Freemen's Purchase," included land on the Quequechan
River and about half of the north pond; the second, the "Pocasset
Grant" or "Purchase," included all of the south pond and the rest of
the north. 195 Holmes initially held that the latter deed conveyed
"the ponds and the water-power embraced within its boundaries to
the grantees as private owners," despite their having been men
tioned only in the habendum, not in the granting clause. l96
If these conveyances had been made before the ordinance was
189.
1891).

Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa I11"), 28 N.E. 257 (Mass.

190. ·See supra note 93 and accOmpanying text.·
191. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa 11"), 18 N.E. 465, 471 (Mass.
1888)..
192. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 257-58.
193. Mark Cheung, Rethinking the History of the Seventeenth-Century Colonial
Ordinance: A Reinterpretation of an Ancient Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115, 127 (1990).
See supra § I . .
194. Real Estate. Wage Reduction Has a Depressing Effect, FALL RIVER DAILY
GLOBE, Sept. 4, 1891, at 8; see also City Defeated. Water Suits Decided by the Supreme
Court, FALL RIVER DAILY GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1891, at 7.
195. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 257. The grants were also referred to collectively as
"The Grand Deed." City Defeated. Water Suits Decided by the Supreme Court, supra
note 194.
196. Watuppa Ill, 28 N.E. at 257. The habendum clause read, "~II the above men
tioned and bounded lands, with all and singular the woods, waters, coves, creeks, ponds,
brooks, benefits, profits, privileges, and hereditaments whatsoever in before arising, ac
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enacted,l97 the plaintiffs' rights would be safely established under
the common law, as the ordinance explicitly exempted prior grants
from its terms, "unless the freemen of the same town or the general
court have otherwise appropriated them."198 If the conveyances
had been made after 1692, plaintiffs would clearly come under the
ordinance's jurisdiction and Watuppa II would apply.199 But as they
were made during the interim; the issue for the court was whether
the ordinance was law in Plymouth Colony before its union with
Massachusetts pU1:suant to the Province Charter of 1692;
Justice Holmes held that only "usage and ... judicial decision"
showed that the ordinance extended to Plymouth before 1692, and
that these were insufficient to alter private rights. 2°O He cited an
earlier case, Litchfield v. Scituate, for the proposition that "the time
when the province charter passed the seals is indicated as the mo
ment when ... the ordinance became applicable to that part of the
state."201 Thus, the Watuppa ponds were exempt fromtheordi
nance's terms before it had legal effect in Plymouth by having been
granted into private hands. The ponds were not reserved for public
use. The common law applied, and the mill owners on the Que
que chan could not be deprived of their water, without due compen
sation from the city.202 Although Wafuppa iI was still good-law in
cruing, belonging, or thereto any ways appertaining, or to any part or parcel thereof."
Id.
197. The ordinance was first published in 1641 and amended every year until
1648. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
198. Colony Ordinance, Section 2 (1647).
199. See Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255,
258 (1832) (stating that the ordinance was "a settled rule of property in every part of
the State").
200. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 258.
201. Id. (citing Litchfield v. Scituate, 136 Mass. 39, 47 (1883».
It is unclear whether the ordinance should 'have been applied to other provinces
even after 1692. On its face, the Province Charter stated that "all the local laws, made
by the late governor and company of Massachusetts Bay, and the late government of
New Plymouth, not repugnant &c., shall continue in force, for the respective places for
which they were made and used." Barker, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) at 258.
202. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 258. The rights of the Troy Cotton & Woolen Manu
factory were not difficult to establish under this rationale, but the court had to strain a
bit for the reservoir company. The reservoir company owned neither land nor water-'
rights. It had, however, built a dam and controlled the water power for the benefit of
the mills. These activities "show[ed] a sufficient possession, under the title of the own
ers, to warrant the issuing of an injunction." Id.
A headline the day of the decision read: Great Pond Law. Supreme -Court
Reverses Its Opinion. Decision That Affects a Vast Deal of Property. The State's Power
over Big Waters Limited. Fall River Must Pay for Its Drinking Supply. The article re
ferred to the case' as "highly important," involving "millions of dollars' worth of prop
erty." BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1891, at 5 (evening ed.). An editorial comment
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the portion of the state that had been Massachusetts Bay Colony,
"the principles of State ownership there announced [did] not apply
to these particular ponds, on account of the Pocasset deed. "203
The company had prevailed over the city by utilizing previ
ously unknown and ancient grants. It was an impressive piece of
research and legal reasoning performed by "a New Bedford man,
well known to lawyers"204 of the time, but· whose identity remains
unknown to this researcher.
The Fall River Daily Evening News referred to a compromise
offer which the company had made before Watuppa III was de
cided. The offer included an annual tax exemption of about $5000
and the provision of some city water for the American Printing
Company if the company were unable to satisfy its needs. The city
had refused the offer, expecting that the judgment would be in its
favor. 205 An article in the Fall River Daily Herald suggested· that if
the city had accepted the offer, it would have been in a better posi
tion. 206 The company's lawyer, however, seemed reasonable when
he stated on the day of the decision:
If we asked for it the judge might issue an injunction re

straining the city from taking ~ater under the .act of 1886, but the
reservoir company will· probably not do anything to interfere
with the comfort of citizens.
the next day said, "[t]he Massachusetts Supreme Court has decided that riparian own
ers have rights by no means to be ignored." Editorial Points, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE,
Sept. 4, 1891, at 4.
203. The City. The Water Suits, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Sept. 3,
1891, at 1.
204. Real Estate. Wage Reduction Has a Depressing Effect, supra note 194.
For the response to the case in the Fall River papers, see, e.g., Against the City.
Black Eye Given Fall River Today by the Supreme Court, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD,
Sept. 3, 1891, at 1; That Opinion. Text of the Ruling Against the Municipality, FALL
RIVER DAILY HERALD, Sept. 4, 1891, at 1 ("It is declared that the decision of the [Mas
sachusetts] [S]upreme [Judicial] [Clourt, that by the Pocasset grant the Watawpa [sic]
company has a prior claim to the ponds, may be law, but it is not justice.").
James Madison Morton, who had been counsel to the mills in the "Watuppa Nui
sance Case" and in Watuppa 1 and 11, was appointed to the Supreme Court bench in
1890. James Madison Morton: A Memorial, 248 Mass. 593, 594 (1924) (supp.). This
was the same year that a relative· (perhaps his father, Marcus Morton, Jr., who wrote
the opinions in those cases) retired as Chief Justice, having served twenty-one years on
the bench. Id. Many of the articles on Watuppa III made the point that James Madison
Morton took no part in the decision, and denied that his appointment had anything to
do with the city losing the case. See, e.g., Against the City. Black Eye Given Fall River

Today by the Supreme Court, supra.
205. See, e.g., The Decision of the Water Suits, ·FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING
NEWS,

Sep~.

206.

4, 1891, at 4.

That Opinion. Text of the Ruling Against the Municipality, supra note 204.
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The only thing for the Reservoir Company now to do is to
prove what its damages have been and sue the city for the taking
of water during the past five or six years. The company can stop
the city from taking water in the future under the act of 1886.
The city can take water under the old act, which requires the pay
ment of damages, the amount of which will be assessed, as for- .
merly, by three commissioners.207

VII.

AFTERWARDS

Neither these opinions nor the law reviews portray the actual
necessity for water power at the time. 20s Even the contemporary
newspapers give only a hint. In fact, steam had been gaining in
importance for decades, as Stetson argued in Watuppa II. 209 By
1860, Fall River had obtained about twenty-five percent of its
power from steam,210 and by the early 1890s it had actually dis
placed water in New England as the primary power source of the
textile industry.211 Fall River's location on the shore enabled it to
import coal cheaply, which gave it such an advantage over its major
competitor, Lowell, that it superseded that city as the country's
largest cotton mill center.212 That is not to say, of course, that water
did not retain sufficient value for other purposes to justify the mills'
considerable interest in it.
In the same way that some of our modem environmental rule
makings drag on for years only to become moot before they are
ever resolved,213 the company and the city finally reached a perma
nent compromise agreement the year after Watuppa III. Under it,
the city was released from any past or future claims for damages
arising from its appropriation of the ponds' water for public pur
poses, provided it would supply the mills with water when the pond
level fell too IOW. 214 This was not an unreasonable burden on the
207. The City. The Water Suits, supra note 203.
208. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
210. 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 486.
211. SMITH, supra note 29, at 40.
212. Id. at 54. In 1871, Representatives of Lowell corporations complained to the
Massachusetts Railroad Commissioners about the high rates and inadequate service
that made the transportation of coal to Lowell so expensive that it could not compete
with Fall River. Id. at 54-55.
213. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CON
GRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 78 (1993) (discussing EPA rule
making spanning 1971-1986).

214. Agreement Between the City of Fall River and the Watuppa Reservoir Com
pany and Others, June 6, 1892, RESERVOIR COMMISSION REPORTS, Dec. 6, 1897.
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city by any means. By this time, water power, and the textile indus
try itself, were nearly at an end all over New England. The success
of Fall River as an industrial city
had been based on the supremacy of steam as the source of
power for new textile mills .... Fall River had definite locational
advantages in comparison with most other New England textile
centers. These continued to operate in some degree as long as
this industry expanded in New England. But after 1890 their sig
nificance was hidden by the rapid rise of print cloth mills in the
South.2IS

By the end of the century, the use of water power from the ponds
was negligible. The ponds were polluted and stagnant, and served
only to cool coal-powered mill engines.216
The very fact that the water was superfluous is significant. The
court did not bend over backwards to protect the company in
Watuppa III because the water was vital to the mills and because
the mills were vital to the community. Watuppa III was decided
(correctly, in my view) because the seventeenth century deeds, re
gardless of whether these immediate plaintiffs were aware of them,
had been relied upon by their predecessors in interest to build an
immense manufacturing enterprise. These expectations were not to
be upset, even at this later date. The case was decided in favor of
the mills because preserving· their settled expectations was simply
the right thing to do.
As noted, the author of Watuppa III was Warren and Brandeis'
good friend, Oliver' Wendell Holmes, Jr. The three socialized fre
quently and it was Brandeis who arranged a teaching position at
Harvard Law School for Holmes in January of 1882, just before
Holmes' appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu
setts.217 Given Brandeis' keen interest and participation in the
controversy that followed the second opinion, it is tempting to spec
215. SMITH, supra note 29, at 79 & ch. III. The advantages of being close to the
cotton fields, advancing technology, and more lenient labor laws made the South a seri
ous competitor; eventually it won out, leaving Northern mill cities ruined. "In 1909,
southern production of print cloth constituted 36 percent of the national total. Fall
River's dominance of the market was gone ...." Id. at 121.
216. 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 534. Fall River had symbolized the triumph of
steam power over water power. Id. In 1895, the Borden family opened "Cotton Mill
Number 4," vastly increasing the city's textile capacity; it put almost six acres of machin
ery in production. Id. at 535. But, only four years after Watuppa Ill, this waterpowered
engine and its millworks were "virtually obsolete when installed." Id.
217. MASON, supra note 114, at 64-65; BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 78
(1994); WHITE, supra .note' 10, at 196-208.
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ulate that he or Warren influenced Holmes to adopt their point of
view in Watuppa III. Although it seems extremely likely that
Holmes was aware of their efforts, I could find no evidence to sup
port this hypothesis. 218
Later in his state court career, Holmes demonstrated his pro
labor stance in his famous dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner.219 It is
possible that in Watuppa III he was influenced by the Fall River
strike (as Mayor Jackson may have been) and hoped that the weav
erswould benefit vicariously by a decision in the company's favor.
But if that were so, he would have been disheartened by a headline
in the Boston Daily Globe the same day the Watuppa III decision
was reported, Down They Go. Wages To Be Reduced in Fall River
Mills. Cut of 10 Per Cent. Expected To Go into Effect Oct. 5. Low
Prices for Prints the Cause Assigned. Operators' Course Causes Big
Surprise. Spinners Postpone Action. Strike Probable. 220 There
never was any peace between the mills and the city until the mills
were gone. 221
In 1994, there are neither mills nor waterfalls in Fall River.
Bridges cross an empty gorge, the Quequechan having been relo
cated to a culvert underneath Interstate 195 in 1960.222 Former mill
buildings serve as outlet stores. North WatuppaPond is the city's
main water source, and the South Pond fulfills its recreational
needs. 223 Thomas Stetson would be pleased.
CONCLUSION

Legal historians William Nelson and Morton Horwitz theorize
that nineteenth century legal reasoning can be divided into two
218. Professor Melvin I. Urofsky, who has edited many volumes of Brandeis' cor
respondence, wrote me: "~know of no direct letters from Brandeis and Warren to
Holmes ...." Letter from Melvin I. Urofsky to Deborah Paulus (Mar. 30, 1993) (on
file with author).
219. 44 N.E. 1077, 1081-82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (stating that the
conflict between labor and management was as much competition as the more tradi
tional kind, between businesses).
220. BOSTON DAILY GLOBE,~Sept. 3, 1891, at 2 (morning ed). See WHITE; supra
note 10, at 365 (discussing Holmes and legill realism).
221. World War I gave Fall River a ten-year period of additional prosperity, but
the South resumed its industrial advance after the war ended. SMITH, supra note 29, at
121. See also Silvia, supra note 149, at 716 ("Fall River was an unfortunate forerunner
of the national depression by five years.").
222. The Quequechan River 1990, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL COMMITTEE 1, 11
(1990).
223. As a public park ultimately resulted, it seems much more reasonable that the
.
city should have been required to compensate the mills.
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broad periods. In the early part of the century, before a court fol
lowed a precedent, it considered whether the precedent furthered a
desirable policy, such as the encouragement of economic growth. If
not, the precedent was rejected on the grounds that society's needs
had changed. 224 But in the middle 1800s, when slavery became a
major issue in national politics, "instrumentalism" gave way and
was followed by a greater respect for precedent and a return to set
tled principles' that derived from religion, American transcendental
ism, and Enlightenment ideas about human rights. 225 The
formalism and the "scientific" jurisprudence of the last half of the
century "'flatter[ed] that longing for. certainty and for repose' that
arose out of the fratricidal strife of the middle and the seeming so
cial chaos of the end of the century."226 One aspect of this shift in
focus was a reinvigorated interest in individual property rights. 227
The Watuppa Ponds cases reflect the struggle to reconcile two
pairs of conflicts. First, there were conflicting contemporary expec
tations, those of the mills that the river would continue to flow and
those of the city that the ponds would supply its steadily increasing
need for water. Second, there were conflicting ancient legal princi
ples, the common law of water rights and the seventeenth century
ordinance. In Holmes' Watuppa III decision, stable legal principles,
and the mills, triumphed through his interpretation of the deeds to
trump the ordinance. Thus, the decision, in its effect on at least part
of the state echoed Shaw's 1852 dicta in Cummings v. Barrett228 and
was consistent with the spirit of the times. Yet the legitimate needs
ofthe public were in no way thwarted by the decision, as the settle
ment a year later provided for them. Consequently, the correct
conclusion, from the perspective of both public and private inter
ests, was ultimately reached without any judicial undermining of
settled principles.
As discussed, Justice Holmes would hold, thirty-one years after
224. NELSON, supra note 153, at 140; see generally, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). But see Harry N. Scheiber,
Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration ofAmerican "Styles ofJudicial
Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975 WIS. L. REv. l.
225. NELSON, supra note 153, at 42-46; see generally, William E. Nelson, The Im
pact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Cen
tury America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) [hereinafter Impact of the Antislavery
Movement].
226.. Impact of the Antislavery Movement, supra note 225, at 566 (citing Oliver W.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897».
227. NELSON, supra note 153, at 47-48.
.
228. 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 186 (1852). See supra text'accompanying notes 146-47.
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Watuppa III, that the statute at issue in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon was a taking of the mining company's property without
compensation and an interference with previously existing rights of
contract, and thus formally open the regulatory takings question. 229
He wrote:
When this seemingly absolute protection [of private property in
the Fifth Amendment] is found to be qualified by the police
power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the
qualification more and more until at last private property disap
pears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the
.
Constitution of the United States.230

The plaintiff in Mahon purchased his property under a deed
that gave him only surface rights. Although the holding appears
harsh, he and his predecessors in interest may have actually benefit
ted from their bargain and their risk by negotiating a lower
purchase price without the subsurface rights. In any case, his
knowledge of his rights makes the case intuitively fair; his expect a,.
tions were established in his deed.231 Although Holmes was forced
to decide a "debatable and ... burning question[ ],"232 and created
in that case an enigma for future·generations of lawyers to grapple
with, still the deed as a representation of settled expectations was
paramount and dispositive for him. Furthermore, his Mahon deci
sion was compatible with takings opinions he wrote on the Massa
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court at approximately the same time
the Watuppa Ponds cases were before it. 233
Brandeis' positions are more complicated. It is clear that his
legal philosophy underwent a significant change over time. His
early career was dominated by a conservative belief in laissez-faire
capitalism, perhaps unsurprising in the son of an entrepreneur.234
This belief is apparent in his partnership with Warren, where most
of his clients were small factory owners, and in his advocacy for the
mills.235 Stephen Baskerville writes that at the time of the Watuppa
229. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
230. Id. at 415.
231. Id. at 416.
232. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 468 (1897).
233. Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes's Early Constitutional Law Theory and Its Applica
tion in,Takings Cases on the Massachuseus Supreme Judicial Court,J18 S. ILL. U. L.J.
357, 375-81 (1994) (discussing Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1889); Miller v.
Horton, 26 N.E. 100 (1891); Bent v. Emery, 53 N.E. 910 (1899».
234. STRUM, supra note 120, at 16.
235. BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 135.
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Ponds cases, Brandeis was still heavily influenced by his education
in the common iaw and !pat he was convinced that those cOQ,cepts
would continue to hold their primary position in American jurispru
dence, despite growing evidence to the contrary after the Civil
War.236 Brandeis' view of the pond controversy could be explained
as exemplifying his belief that judicial evaluations of the common
law were preferable .to statutes, given the susceptibility of legisla
tors to special interests.237 .
His ideas gradually evolved into what Philippa Strum called an
"egalitarian economic definition of democracy," which the justice
had adopted by 1913 and would retain.238 Brandeis wrote, "rights
of property and the liberty of the individual must be remoulded,
from time to time, to meet the changing needs of society."239 A
year later, dissenting'in Mahon, he wrote that an exercise of the
police power that deprived an owner of the use of his property still
provided that owner with "the advantage of living and doing busi
ness in a civilized community."~40 It is thus logical to hypothesize
that he would have agreed with the majority opinion in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.. DeBenedictis, despite his early distrust of
legislatures. 241
. I believe that Keystone was incorrectly decided because of its
tendency to undermine principles necessary to a stable society. As
William O. Douglas wrote:
The law is not properly susceptible to whim. or caprice. It must
have the sturdy qualities required of every framework that is
designed for substantial structures. Moreover, it must have uni
formity when applied to the daily affairs of men.
Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to many ac
tivities. If they are not present, the integrity of contracts, wills,
conveyances and securities is impaired. And there will be no
equal justice under law ifa negligence rule is applied in the
morning but not in the aftemoon. 242
I do not deny the usefulness of regulatory statutes to environ
mental interests. However, it is important to note the potential for
abuse that Keystone created. While the statute at issue in that case
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

[d. at 78-79.
[d. at 99-100, 112. See supra part N on the Watuppa Nuisance.
STRUM, supra note 120, at 12, 20-23.
1h1ax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 376 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922).
480 U.S. 470 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REV. 735, 735-36 (1949).
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was no doubt enacted to benefit the public,243'Keystone gave legis
latures the idea that many exercises of the police power would not
result in compensable takings. 244 The case made it easier for states
to enact laws and regulations that are not justified and that inter
rupt private expectations unfairly.
Perhaps the course of legal reasoning in the nineteenth century
conceals a lesson for the twentieth. A return to settled principles of
law, such as the respect for property that recurred at the end of the
last century, might be in order. 245 Arguably, such respect was sub
rogated to the public enthusiasm for environmental regulation that
began in the 1960s, just as it was subrogated to the desire for eco
nomic expansion and industrial development in the early nine
teenth century.
While regulation is nec~ssary in a crowded and complex world,
government is simply not constitutionally authorized to regulate
away the value of property any more than it can appropriate or
invade it, without good public reason and just compensation. As
Justice Rehnquist stated in Keystone, in language reminiscent of
Justice Holmes in Mahon,246 a broad exception to the just compen
sation requirement of the Fifth Amendment based ~pon the police
power ."would surely allow government much greater authority
than we have recognized to impose societal burdens on individual
landowners, for nearly every action the government takes is in
tended to secure for the public an extra measure of 'health, safety,
and welfare. "'247
. The Supreme Court has not provided the guidance expected of
it in this problematic area for some time. In Keystone, four justices
dissented. 248 In Nollan, five justices joined a total of three dis
sents.249 In First English, the most cohesive of these decisions, one
243. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492.
244. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895,901 (S. C. 1991)
rev'd 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
245. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992)
("[Als it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action
for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance
and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends ....").
.
246. See supra text accompanying note 230.
247. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 506 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, O'Connor, and
Scalia, JJ.).
.
249. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 866 (Ste
vens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.).
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dissent was joined in part by two other justices.250 In Lucas, one
justice concurred,251 two dissented separately,252 and one filed a
separate statement asserting that the writ of certiorari should have
been dismissed in the first place. 253 By returning to stabilizing prin
ciples such as those illustrated by the Watuppa Ponds cases, the
Court could clarify its ambiguous message in takings jurispn~dence .

. 250. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined in Parts I and III by Blackmun and
O'Connor, 11.).
251. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 (1992) (Ken
nedy, J., concurring).
252. [d. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); and. id. at 2917 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
253. [d. at 2925 (Souter, J., filing a separate statement).

